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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
AT A  TURNING POINT Since October 6th 1983, the European Community, its Member States 
and the 63 countries of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group have 
been involved in the renegotiation of the Lome Convention, the centre-
piece of the Community's development cooperation policy. The negotia-
tions will be long, but none of the parties involved believes that they will 
end  without  full  agreement  on  a  new  convention.  This  confidence 
underlines the importance the Community and its Third World partners 
attach to ensuring the continuity of their commitments and contractual 
relations. 
Yet, today, the EC's development policy is at a crossroads. A change 
of direction is taking place, slowly but surely. The new guidelines have 
been drawn up gradually over the past three years. 
One of the starting points of this process was the debate in  the Euro-
pean Parliament on world hunger (in October 1979 and then in 1980, on 
the basis of the Ferrero Report).(1) This debate, like the others which 
followed in both the European and national Parliaments, plus the initiatives 
adopted by leading Nobel Prize winners and other personalities reveal-
ed an increasing sensitivity on the part of public opinion to the fate of 
the poorest peoples of the Third World. These initiatives also brought 
home the need to adopt new methods of implementing development 
policy. 
The conclusions of the European Parliament debate led the Community 
to devote increased attention to the poorest peoples and countries and 
to give a clear priority to fighting hunger and fostering agricultural and 
rural development in the Third World. As a result, the European Com-
mission presented to the Council of Ministers of the Ten,in October 1981, 
an «Action Plan to Combat World Hunger». This included sections call-
ing for short term measures with immediate impact and longer term ac-
tion to deal with the structural causes of the developing countries' food 
problems.(2) The Council adopted the plan in  February 1982. 
For the short term, the plan provides for a special food aid action to help 
counter the consequences of the supply deficits currently encountered 
by the poorest countries.(3) It also calls for a larger Community contribu-
tion to international operations whose aim is to increase the security of 
Third World food supplies. In the longer term, and this is an innovation 
in development policy, the Commmission proposes that the EC gives ac-
tive backing to «food strategies» implemented by developing countries 
to place their own efforts and those of aid donor nations in a more coherent 
framework. For these countries, the Community and its Member States 
intend to propose a greater degree of coordination of aid policies and 
programmes  in  order to  reinforce,  by their joint  efforts,  their  overall 
effectiveness. 
(1)  European  Parliament,  Document 1-341/80 of 5th September 1980. 
(2)  COM  (81)  560 of 2nd  October 1981. 
(3)  A total of 40m Ecus was  used for the purchase of 230,000 tonnes of cereals and other pro-
ducts, the equivalent of the annual food  intake of two million  underfed people. 
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Another innovation is the concept of «thematic actions•• which would apply 
to whole regions of the world where all the countries are faced with the 
same kind of specific difficulties in fighting against worsening conditions 
of production or in mobilising the full potential of their natural resources. 
In  May 1982, therefore,  the Commission proposed to the Council  of 
Ministers a special action programme in favour of Central America whose 
principal goal was to support agrarian reform being undertaken in the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.(1) Although 
the adoption caused certain political difficulties (essentially because of 
the inclusion of Nicaragua), it is important to underline that the Council 
did in fact follow the Commission in supporting agrarian reform (i.e. social 
reform) in  all four countries.(2) 
In  June  1982,  the  Commission  supplemented  its  action  programme 
against  hunger by proposing a  special  programme worth  185 million 
Ecus.(3) The Council reduced this to 115 million Ecus, of which 35 million 
were reserved for emergency action in favour of refugees and displaced 
persons (including Afghan refugees in Pakistan) as well as civil popula-
tions affected by events in South-East Asia, Central America and Angola. 
The  bulk of the  remainder was earmarked  for  agricultural  and  rural 
development programmes in the poorest Third World countries. 
The principal aim of the above programmes was to reduce dependence 
on external food sources among the developing countries through ac-
tion which helps these nations produce themselves the food they need. 
This goal is based on two considerations : the first is that the number 
of people threatened by famine is increasing rapidly. There are about 
450 million people in this situation today and this could rise, according 
to World Bank estimates, to 700-800 million in the next 20 years. The 
second consideration is that Third World dependance on imported food, 
taken globally, is rising since food production is not growing fast enough 
to meet local needs. Cereal imports which totalled 52 million tonnes a 
year in the 1972/74 period could, on FAO estimates, exceed 90 million 
tonnes in 1985. 
A more systematic approach 
the Commission Memorandum on  Development policy 
During 1982 and 1983, the European Commission drew up a new, more 
systematic approach. On 30th September 1982, it published a Memoran-
dum(4) which contains the general principles and guidelines that should 
be at the heart of Community development policy for the rest of the pre-
(1)  COM  (82)  257  of  19th  May  1982. 
(2)  The programme, worth 56,7m Ecus,  was divided as follows  : 18m for Costa Rica,  16.9m for 
Honduras,  12m  for the Dominican  Republic and  9.8m for Nicaragua. 
(3)  COM  (82)  320  of 3rd  June 1982. 
(4)  Memorandum on  Community Development Policy: COM  (82)  640. 
4 sent decade. At the same time, it began revising its food aid policy in 
order to make it a more effective tool of economic development. 
The Commission Memorandum has, since its publication, been at the 
centre of a wide-ranging debate in the European Parliament as well as 
in the Council of Ministers and the Economic and Social Committee. Its 
guidelines were at the root of the Community's proposals for renewing 
the Lome Convention and of its March 1983 proposals for a new food 
aid policy.(1) 
In its new approach, the Commission had to take account of several fac-
tors. These included the worldwide economic recession, the balance-sheet 
(largely a disappointing one) of two development decades, the crisis in 
the multilateral system of development cooperation as well as East-West 
tensions which  are  compromising  the  continuation  of a  North-South 
dialogue as such. 
The factors 
The economic recession affects all countries. But it has a greater impact 
on the developing world than on the industrialised nations. It is not just 
a question of adjusting a certain number of divergent factors over time 
to bring them back in line again. The crisis is a structural one «from which 
the world will emerge different from what it was before, with a new divi-
sion of wealth, knowledge, power centres and peoples».(2) 
The European Commission believes tha~ the crisis cannot be overcome 
without stimulating economic recovery in the developing countries which 
in turn is being blocked by the recession.(3) If the recovery in the Com-
munity and most other industrialised countries is slow and fragile, it is 
totally compromised in that part of the Third World where excessive debt 
levels have forced governments to pursue rigorous austerity program-
mes. In many developing countries, the bulk of export revenues have to 
go towards servicing foreign debts, a situation made even worse by high 
real  interest rates. 
This situation not only blocks foreign investments in these countries, it 
also  means that they cannot import the  most basic  items,  including 
foodstuffs. It was the process of borrowing by these debtor countries to 
pay for imports that helped keep economic activity in the industrialised 
countries at a substantial level. For without the indebtedness of the Third 
World countries, the level of unemployment, to take just one aspect, would 
be even higher than it is in Europe. In  deciding how to deal with Third 
{1)  Community Food Aid: A New Approach, Doc X/386/82,  December 1982; and doc. COM  (83) 
141,  24th  March  1983. 
(2)  Speech by Development Commissioner Edgard Pisani at the opening session of the EC-ACP 
negotiations, Luxembourg, 6th  October 1983. 
{3)  Memorandum, op cit,  Page  2. 
5 World debt, the western industrialised nations are also taking decisions 
that will fundamentally affect their own productive activities. 
The  foregoing  is  only  one  of  the  many  aspects  of  economic  in-
terdependence between Europe and the Third World. «It is therefore out 
of  self-interest  as  well  as  because  of  its  sensitivity  to  the  subtle 
mechanisms of economic recovery that the Community is able to remain 
true to a concept which it believes to be fundamental for the future of 
the world».(!) This is why the Community is determined to promote the 
creation  of  an  international  economic  order  where  the  logic  of  in-
terdependence far outweighs that of conflict. It is therefore in the Com-
munity's own interest that in  its relations with the Third World it  puts 
development at the centre of its preoccupations. 
As the Commission notes in its Memorandum, the global balance sheet 
of two development decades shows that the means employed were first-
ly inadequate and secondly badly used. Even if for one billion (2) people 
in the Third World their per capita income has nearly doubled in the past 
20 years,  a dramatic and widening gap has opened up between these 
middle-income countries and the poorest nations where the per capita 
income has scarcely risen and in some cases has actually fallen. This 
is notably the case for a certain number of African countries with which 
the Community has privileged links. 
The Memorandum states that in 1980 no fewer than 750 million people, 
one third of the population of the developing world (China excluded) live, 
or rather subsist, in conditions of absolute poverty. If in global terms, food 
production in the LDCs has kept pace with population growth, the number 
of underfed people in South Asia, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa 
is actually increasing. The trend in Africa has worsened since the second 
half of the 1970s. These figures are taken at random from the Memoran-
dum; one could easily quote others, which are just as significant. 
Financial aid from donor countries and international organisations has 
also helped to deepen the split between the poorest nations and the rest 
of the Third World. In fact, aid is generally given to middle income coun-
tries, which have received an average of 12 dollars per capita each year, 
albeit a modest sum, but more than twice the five dollars per head receiv-
ed by the poorest developing nations. 
However, this paradoxical share-out of financial aid is partly the direct 
consequence of the degree of underdevelopment of the poorest coun-
tries, which the aid is supposed to alleviate. For development aid, tradi-
tionally linked to financing projects and direct investments, is more easi-
ly assimilated by developing countries which already have an adequate 
economic and administrative infrastructure and whose internal policies 
foster the expansion of local productive forces. 
(1)  Speech  by  Edgard  Pisani,  op cit. 
(2)  «billion»  is  used throughout the  present document in  preference to  «thousand  million». 
6 The Memorandum highlights among the several factors responsible for 
the economic backwardness of the poorest countries political, social and 
military instability. «The increase in the frequency of conflicts of all sorts 
has made worse the poverty of certain regions and o·f  certain sections 
of the population (refugees) without it being possible to say whether in-
stability is the cause or the consequence of the poverty. It is both at the 
same time».(1) 
At world level, one of the most discouraging factors of economic coopera-
tion stems from the blockage of the North-South dialogue, as illustrated 
in  the virtual failure of the Cancun summit, the impasse of the global 
negotiations and the crisis in financing the International Development 
Agency (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank. Any judgment of the events 
that have marked the North-South dialogue since 1981 can only be very 
negative :«The global negotiations aimed at creating a new international 
order have been unsuccessful. They were inspired by ambitions that were 
either too grand or at least premature. It will perhaps take a generation 
before there can be any chance of success  ... Cancun failed, Williamsburg 
gave no guidance, Belgrade was a sumptuous high mass with neither 
rite nor faith. The new international economic order and the global negotia-
tions have been virtually forgotten,  after having consumed too  much 
energy. What remains is poverty, debt and a global imbalance>>.(2) 
The Commission Memorandum, published a year before the UNCTAD 
Conference of June 1983 in  Belgrade provides a comprehensive,  but 
pessimistic, analysis of the North-South dialogue. It concludes: «The Com-
munity has a basic interest in  the stability of the international system, 
in the security of its functional norms, in the predictability of its behaviour. 
As a political and commercial power, it has a natural interest in promoting 
the  creation  of  an  international  system  which  backs the  logic  of  in-
terdependence over that oj conflict. To this extent its interests are close 
to those of the Third World  ... For these reasons, the Community cannot 
resign itself to a long-term blockage of the North-South dialogue. It can-
not allow the East-West confrontation (which can only be settled in terms 
of force) to stifle the North-South dialogue (which finds its expression in 
terms of development)>>.(3) 
(1)  Memorandum, op.  cit.  Page  8. 
(2)  Edgard Pisani. «What is at stake in the Lome Convention••: article published in Europa-Archiv, 
August  1983. 
(3)  Memorandum, op  cit. 
7 The main guidelines of development policy 
The Community's response to these challenges is to be found in two com-
plementary approaches : 
The Community must strengthen and rationalise the network of 
contractual relations which it has established with the countries 
of the Third World, thereby contributing to the «Creation  of a 
system of international relations which is more harmonious, more 
sure and more in  line with the interests of all countries». The 
Memorandum notes on this topic : ccBetween the politics of Lome 
(which covers a group of countries) and those of the North-South 
dialogue (which is addressed to all  LDCs) there is room for a 
broader application of the North-South doctrine which the Com-
munity has adopted. 
The Community must, in  its development programmes, reex-
amine its priorities, instruments and working methods in order 
to give more effective support to the self-centred and  lasting 
development  of  the  Third  World,  particularly  of  its  poorest 
members. 
The first approach is essentially the continuation of past policies, whereas 
the second, that of the more concrete development realities,  requires 
substantial renovation of methods applied hitherto. 
The priority of more autonomous development 
The analysis of the results of two decades of development policy leads 
the Commission to put the support for autonomous and long-term develop-
ment of  LDCs,  particularly the  poorest  among them,  among  its first 
priorities. 
Throughout the 1970s the concern of respecting at all cost the political 
independence of its Third World partners seemed to oblige the Community 
to  adopt  a  <<neutral»  status  in  questions  of development  policy.  But 
henceforth the Commission is seeking to enter into a dialogue with its 
partners on the aims of development cooperation. 
This does not mean that the Community seeks to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the developing countries. What it does mean is that the Com-
munity wants to push further foreward the logic of dialogue and of mutual 
commitment which inspires the «Lome philosophy». This will require a 
clearer  definition  of  mutual  responsibilities,  not  only. as  regards  the 
measures to be taken but also the results to be achieved in development 
terms. To this end, the Community should bring into the discussion its 
own conception of aims and methods for attaining them. 
8 The aims and methods proposed by the Commission 
The broad aim of the Community is to try to support by flanking measures 
the application of a policy of autonomous or self-centred development. 
This is why it is trying to foster the attainment of self-sufficiency in food 
for local populations and local regions. It also implies support for an ac-
tive policy of rural developement and for the definition of an economic 
policy that would stimulate local food production. In other terms, the Com-
munity wishes to make sure that agriculture and rural development (which 
concern more than 90°/o of Third World populations) become the driving 
force of more general economic advancement. 
Development policy should be geared to stemming rural depopulation, 
to re-establishing or preserving ecological balances, to ensuring supplies 
of drinking water, to creating basic health services and schools. It should 
be the poorest sectors of the population that reap most benefit from Com-
munity aid. 
The Community must contribute to the development of human resources 
and to increasing the awareness of the cultural dimensions of develop-
ment. These principles constitute no doubt an innovation in the field of 
development policy. This means that, inter alia, the Community should 
contribute to the expansion of local  scientific and  technical  research 
capacities, and to the use of science in the service of development. 
After  having  too  long  considered  development  as  a  technical 
phenomenon, the time has come to realise it means more than supply-
ing equipment. Development is clearly a human and political phenomenon. 
«There is no development without education or without the evolution of 
social structures and behaviour patterns. There can be no development 
without rational and coherent economic policies».(1) 
It is manifestly clear that these objectives fixed by the Commission can-
not be attained by merely increasing the amount of financial aid granted. 
It requires a qualitative change in economic cooperation. The dialogue 
on economic policy which the Community is seeking, particularly with 
its Lome partners involved in the renewal of the Convention, is a vital 
element in  this change. 
«We do not want to impose anything; our aim is to debate. The Community 
is no longer saying to the ACP countries : 'this money belongs to you, 
tell us what you want to do with it'. It is now telling them : 'this money 
is available, these facilities are being offered, let us see together, in line 
with your priorities and disciplines, how you  can derive the maximum 
benefit from it. Let us do more than just discuss physical projects to be 
financed, by examining programmes to support and policies to under-
pin. Yours will be the final decision, but not without being obliged by this 
{1)  Edgard Pisani, op  cit. 
9 method to  define for your own  usage  your priorities,  disciplines and 
policies'».(1) 
The Commission is already trying out this approach in the framework of 
its support for the food strategies drawn up by certain African countries. 
These currently include Kenya,  Rwanda, Mali and Zambia. 
The «dialogue» consists of agreeing on the actual tasks to be carried out 
by each side so that these countries' food and agricultural policies begin 
to bear fruit. This will of course not happen overnight; several years will 
be required. But this is one concrete application of the principle whereby 
the Community's development policy should not just consist of projects 
and programmes but should also, as far as possible, support longer-term 
policies. 
This requires corresponding long-term commitments by all the parties 
concerned. The Community is trying to lay the contractual basis which 
will  simultaneously bring about a  better predictability in actions to be 
undertaken  and  enable  all  internal  and  external  measures  linked  to 
development to be better coordinated. It is in this optic that the Community 
has also begun to revise its food aid policy, which should no longer be 
an end in itself but an instrument of agricultural development (see below). 
Strengthening the network of contractual relations with the 
Third World 
If the Community's dominant concern is to give a new effectiveness to 
its development activities, it is not neglecting the framework in which these 
activities are set : the cooperation agreements concluded between it and 
many Third World partners. 
In its Memorandum, the Commission sets as the aim the «establishment 
or the deepening of lasting contractual relations between Europe and its 
partners, based on solidarity and mutual interest». And it adds : ccBy  its 
very existence the Community, even if incomplete, constitutes a call for 
the reorganisation of world economic relations.  It calls on countries to 
go beyond the traditional schema of relations between nation states and 
replace this gradually by a system of relations between regional group-
ings or large continental units, basing their relationship and their mutual 
self-interest on the predictability and the security of the contract negotiated 
between equals and managed jointly». 
It is in the name of this doctrine that the Commission proposes both con-
solidating and further developing the existing cooperation systems. EC-
ACP cooperation which should enable «Common action for development 
to be increased» has been based until now on conventions which have 
been renegotiated every five years. The Commission has suggested that 
(1)  Ibid. 
10 the Ten propose to the ACP states a Convention of unlimited duration, 
flanked by specific protocols or agreements (1) of various fixed durations. 
In  this way, in  a unique and permanent framework, the partners could 
take account of the unity of the ACP group and the necessary predic-
tability of long-term action. This framework would also enable the Con-
vention to respond to specific problems as well as to the diversity of local 
and regional situations. To this end, the Commission intends proposing 
the reinforcement of measures to foster regional cooperation. (Later in 
this chapter, the proposals for renewing the Lome Convention are look-
ed at in  detail). 
The agreements concluded between the EC and the developing coun-
tries of the Southern Mediterranean are of unlimited duration. However, 
they ar not regional agreements but bilateral ones between each of the 
countries concerned and the Community. The Commission would like 
to see this cooperation developed in future to its true dimension - that 
of an overall convention linking one region to another. This desirable con-
solidation does not however dispense the Community from honouring fully 
its current commitments entered into with the Mediterranean countries, 
particularly in the trade sector, nor of planning the future Mediterranean 
policy of an EC enlarged to 12 Member States with the entry of Spain 
and Portugal. (2) 
With the other Third World countries outside these groupings (which are 
called «non-associated» developing countries because they have no links 
of association with the EC), the Commission wants to organise stable 
cooperation relations and where possible to use these to promote in turn 
their own intra-regional cooperation. 
Referring to both Latin America and Asia, the Commission notes that the 
best way of strengthening cooperation with the poorer countries of these 
regions is to step up the level of aid while the best approach for the more 
advanced nations of these regions is to seek a form of cooperation which 
will be more and more balanced. The Commission proposes increasing 
the contractual contents of existing agreements (with ASEAN, India, Brazil 
and Mexico). It also suggests the possibility of adding a financial dimen-
sion to its cooperation agreements. 
Outside these agreements, the Community will continue its development 
action by concentrating it in those countries and regions where it can 
combat poverty and hunger by giving financial aid for the rural develop-
ment of the poorest countries. 
Financial resources : long-term commitments 
A more effective development policy and closer cooperation links with 
(1)  In  particular,  its  financial  protocol. 
(2)  See  Commission's communication to  Council of 24th June 1982 - COM  (82)  353  final. 
11 the developing world require that the Community re-examine the size and 
scope of its operations - be they in the areas of financial aid, food aid 
or trade policy instruments. The Commission's priority is to give these 
actions a greater degree of predictability. 
The Commission does not try to minimise the need for the Community 
to increase the level of its financial aid.  It notes, for instance, that aid 
flows, although rising in real terms, were inadequate to offset the negative 
effect of the worldwide recession on the poorest countries. But it also 
believes first and foremost that the increase in the amount of Communi-
ty aid should be determined by the real  increase in Europe's capacity 
to  pay,  although  at  the  same  time  the  irreversible  and  progressive 
character of Community financial aid would be confirmed. 
Community aid represents at present about 1  0°/o of total aid granted by 
Member States, the equivalent therefore of 0.5 pro mille of their combin-
ed GNPs. The Commission proposes that the Community set itself the 
target of increasing Community aid to 1 pro mille of GNP in gradual stages 
over the next ten years. 
This increase in budgetary contributions should be accompanied by a 
reinforcement of other methods of financial aid : 
- extending the lending possibilities of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) beyond the current ACP-Mediterranean zone; 
using the Community's own loan-raising potential for the benefit 
of  the  developing  countries,  particularly  to  finance  viable 
economic investments; 
promoting private investments by drawing up an adequate con-
tractual framework. 
The Commission also believes the Community should endeavour to in-
troduce  more  flexibility  in  the  management  of  its  different  financial 
resources.  This  implies for one thing that the money available either 
through the EC budget or through the European Development Fund (EDF) 
should be brought together in one single budget. 
The predictability of EC-Third World trade relations 
The Community is the biggest trading partner of the developing coun-
tries; it is also the industrial entity which is most open to their exports. 
«In  this context, the first priority for the Community is to ensure that its 
trading system has a maximum of predictability. This is more important 
for its trading partners and for the EC's credibility  ... than some element 
of limited progress towards trade liberalisation)). The Commission defines 
its approach as follows : 
12 
the maintenance for a long period of the preferential regime ap-
plied to the ACP states on the model of the regime granted to 
the Mediterranean countries, together with improved consulta-tion mechanisms for avoiding the emergence of crisis situations; 
efforts based on the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
or on  existing cooperation agreements to increase trade with 
countries or groups of countries (India,  ASEAN,  the Andean 
Pact); 
for the more advanced developing nations of Asia and  Latin 
America, a future evolution of trade relations increasingly bas-
ed on the notion of graduated reciprocity. 
For raw materials, a parallel area to trade policy, the Commission recalls 
the necessary commitment of the Community to seeking new ways of 
its own to limit price fluctuations. This commitment should be translated 
at international level by EC participation in the negotiations for individual 
product agreements and at regional level by seeking appropriate solu-
tions with the producer nations concerned. It is in this spirit that the Com-
mission is to put forward its proposals to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the existing mechanisms in  the EC-ACP framework (Stabex, Sysmin, 
sugar protocol, etc). It also proposed that the Sixth UNCTAD Conference 
in  Belgrade discuss the creation  of a  Stabex system for all  the least 
developed countries, in  addition to those in  the Lome Convention. 
The revision of Food aid policies 
After several years of discussion, the Community has redefined the prin-
ciples that will in future govern its food aid to !he countries of the Third 
World. The Council of Ministers approved on 23rd  November 1983 a 
resolution to this effect. The resolution followf; the Commission's con-
ceptions, notably that the outright gift of foodstuffs to poor countries can 
have ccperverse»  effects on the recipient countries. These can take the 
form of creating food preferences which would be impossible to satisfy 
in  the future,  or of creating  long term  dependence on  the aid,  or of 
discouraging local production. The essential objective has to be the en-
couragement of food self-sufficiency on the part of the recipient nations. 
The second principle is that the foodstuffs given in aid should first and 
foremost respond to the nutritional requirements of the recipients and 
not merely reflect the surplus disposal policies of the donor countries. 
The countries which will benefit from the Community's food aid will still 
be the low-income food deficit countries, although least favoured popula-
tion groups in other developing nations will also be able to benefit in times 
of emergency. Wherever possible, food aid should be granted along with 
other aid forms,  notably aid to agricultural production programmed for 
a set period o·f time. These combined aids should aim at supporting the 
development of food  for local  consumption  and  rural  development in 
general. Food aid operations will be concluded by preference with coun-
tries who pian parallel measures towards attaining food self-sufficiency. 
13 These programmes can be envisaged in cooperation with international 
or non-governmental organisations specialised in development aid. Long-
term programmes will be established after discussion with the beneficiary 
country on  the basis of an assessment of its overall situation. 
Except where there is an increased utilisation of local products (through 
so-called triangular operations), purchases must in the first instance take 
account of what is available on the Community market. Triangular opera-
tions- the purchase by the Community of food from an LDC with an ex-
portable  surplus for the  benefit of a  food  deficit country - are to  be 
encouraged. 
The generation of government revenues by the local sale of food aid sup-
plied by the Community should not be considered an end in itself. These 
revenues should be used in principle to finance the creation or the runn-
ing of agricultural development projects in the beneficiary countries so 
as to support a policy of food self-sufficiency. 
For i 982, the EC's food aid programme provided for i.  i  million tonnes 
of cereals (the equivalent of just over i% of the LDCs global import needs), 
i 50,000 tonnes of milk powder, 45,000 tonnes of butte  roil at a total cost 
of 700 million Ecus. Two thirds of the cost is accounted for by the dairy 
sector. More than 60 countries, and several international organisations, 
receive EC food aid. The principal beneficiaries are Bangladesh, Egypt 
and India as well as the ACP countries which as a group accounted for 
360/o  of the i 982 programme. For i 983, the Commission proposed the 
following quantities : cereals 1,04 million tonnes, milk powder i 50,000 
tonnes, butte  roil 46,000 tonnes, sugar i 0,000 tonnes. It also proposed 
deliveries of other products dried fish, certain vegetables, olive oil - in 
amounts to be determined. 
On 23rd November i 983, the Commission presented to the Council of 
Ministers a draft regulation which sought in certain cases to carry out 
«Substitution  actions»  in  the form of financial aid  in  the place of food 
shipments.(i) 
This  draft  regulation,  part  of  the  supporting  framework  for  «food 
strategies», takes into account the concrete difficulties experienced by 
certain developing countries in taking delivery and distributing in a satisfac-
tory manner actual shipments of food aid. The experience of Mali, for 
example, has shown the Commission that in certain circumstances, finan-
cial aid given for a precise purpose can be preferable to shipments of 
foodstuffs. The aim of the financial aid is still to contribute to local food 
self-sufficiency and is not meant to cover balance of payments deficits. 
The Commission proposes financial aid instead of food for an equivalent 
value in the following cases :a) when the money is used to buy in items 
essential for food production; b) to finance stockpiling -at village, local, 
(1)  COM  (83)  695. 
14 national or regional level; c) to finance rural credits; d) to pay for transport, 
marketing operations or for the processing of food crops locally; e)  to 
finance applied research activities and training programmes locally; f) 
to finance projects to develop local production of food crops. 
Preparation for a new EC-ACP Convention 
The renegotiation of the Lome Convention provides the Community with 
a unique occasion to open a dialogue with the 63 ACP countries on the 
aims and methods of its development cooperation policy. 
The European Community is determined, however, to consolidate its rela-
tionship with the ACP countries, especially in view of the stalemate in 
the North-South dialogue. The emphasis will be on developing and im-
proving the main elements of the Lome relationship. This includes a rein-
forcement of the contractual nature of EC aid to the ACP states, the fix-
ing of mechanisms so that the ACP can count on a certain amount of 
EC money every year and on certain specific benefits in the crucial trade 
sector, the strengthening of the global framework for cooperation pro-
vided by the Lome Convention. However despite the Convention's institu-
tional framework, the EC-ACP relationship remains a flexible one. 
A mere renewal of the existing contract will not be enough, according 
to the Commission. What is needed is more originality, more effectiveness, 
more shared responsibility in running the Convention, a willingness to 
undertake a veritable «policy dialogue» which would lead to reciprocal 
commitments by the EC and the ACP. In order to achieve this, the Com-
mission recommended that negotiations for the new Convention should 
begin with  a  political  debate between the two sides.  Discussions on 
technical issues-the instruments of development, as it were-would follow 
later. 
Such a political debate would give both sides the opportunity to discuss 
and reach agreement on the kind of development they want. For the ACP 
states, the emphasis is expected to be on meeting the objectives for the 
agricultural and industrial development of Africa set out in the Lagos Plan 
of Action. The Plan,  adopted by heads of State of the Organisation of 
African  Unity (OAU)  in  1980, puts the  accent on  developing Africa's 
agricultural resources and on ensuring that Africa relies on  authentic 
models of development rather than imported ones. 
For the Commission, the focus will be on outlining the priority aims of 
its future development policy along the following guidelines : 
* *  priority should go to developing rather than mere .. equipping», 
and in particular to developing agriculture production and self-
sufficiency in food in the ACP countries; the Commission intends 
to implement its «food strategy» in order to attain these objectives. 
* *  the implementation of a series of long-term campaigns to be car-
15 ried out on a national and regional levels and designed to pro-
tect Africa's human and natural environment from the negative 
effects of certain types of development projects. 
* *  the emphasis will be on self-determined, self-sustaining , self-
reliant development which is as independent as possible of im-
ported  models and  based  on  a  broad  understanding of the 
cultural, historical and geographical factors which condition all 
social advancement; 
* *  it is no longer enough merely to discuss individual projects with 
developing  countries;  what  is  needed  is  a  broader political 
dialogue on actual cooperation policies; 
* *  all instruments and all operations must be coordinated to pre-
vent inconsistency and waste; food aid should be integrated with 
the other instruments of development and Member States' opera-
tions should be coordinated with those of the Community; 
* *  aid should be both more predictable and more flexible; 
* *  trade arrangements established under the Lome Convention 
should be consolidated. 
The Commission has made it clear that it will be looking for «greater con-
tinuity in a cooperation system which has the manifest support of the Com-
munity and the ACP but is thrown into the melting pot at each renegotia-
tion». (1) In other words, it proposed a third Convention which would be 
of indefinite duration, one that does not have to be renegotiated every 
five years. Such a framework convention would establish the principles, 
objectives, key features and institutional machinery of EC-ACP coopera-
tion. This could not incorporate additional protocols as at present on sugar, 
bananas, and rurn, whose implementation and duration would have to 
be tailored to their specific subject. 
This continuity would make it possible to undertake certain activities which 
are indispensable for development but which require long-term planning 
and action : for instance, the fight against desertification, the preserva-
tion of tropical forests, soil management, and the management of natural 
and  energy  resources,  the  development of indigenous scientific and 
technical research capacity, the fight against the major endemic diseases, 
etc. 
Moreover, apart from the practical reasons for such a longterm arrange-
ment, a convention without «deadlines» would also have a symbolic value : 
it will underline the faith of all concerned in the durability of the EC-ACP 
relationship. 
The Commission believes that «Security» will be the key word when it 
comes to renegotiating the trade arrangements included in the Lome Con-
(i)  Memorandum op.cit. 
i6 vention. In  other words, the current regime which provides for the free 
entry of ACP goods on the EC market must be maintained and, if possi-
ble, improved. But, since the ACP states will only be in a position to real-
ly use these trade advantages once they have reached a certain level 
of development, the Commission suggests that an element of «predic-
tabilitY•• should be written into the new Convention. Such a reinforcement 
of the trade arrangements should be specific, for instance when it comes 
to products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy, and long-term. 
But, the continued access to European markets should not prevent the 
ACP states from developing their own internal and regional markets. As 
such, the Commission intends to back ACP attempts to forge a more 
coherent and dynamic intra-ACP regional market. 
The Commission has also called for the maintenance and reinforcement 
of the Convention's system for the stabilisation of ACP export earnings 
- STABEX - and of the mechanism for assuring ACP mineral develop-
ment - SYSMIN - in the new EC-ACP arrangement. This is necessary, 
according to the Commission, because of the continuing difficulties fac-
ing ACP commodity producers, fluctuations in world prices for major raw 
materials and the lack of international measures in the commodity sec-
tor. But, the Commission points out that both Stabex and Sysmin should 
be used as «development tools•• and not just as a source of general deficit 
funding in  the next Convention  .(1) 
Stabex should see an increase in its financial resources so that the money 
available for transfers to the ACP states is in  keeping with the number 
of commodities covered by the system and the different «risks» involved. 
The Commission makes it clear, however, that the system must, in the 
future, contribute directly to the economic well-being of the sector affected 
by the fall in export earnings and where necessary to the diversification 
of the agricultural sector of the country concerned. 
Similarly, Sysmin should be «readjusted» so that its transfers do more 
than just ensure the maintenance of a certain production volume. Sysmin 
interventions, says the Commission, should be designed to provoke an 
effective development of the ACP mineral sector. Here once again regional 
development and cooperation will be important. 
The focus in the agricultural chapters of the new Convention will be on 
promoting subsistence farming and encouraging rural development as 
a whole. In the energy sector, in addition to large-scale projects such as 
hydro~electric dams and power plants, the Community should try to help 
ACP countries in promoting a more rational use and conservation of its 
fuelwood. In the industrial sector, the new agreement will try to encourage 
the development of small and medium-sized businesses. 
Finally, in order to meet these new objectives, the Commission highlights 
the need for a real  increase in  available funds and warns that a mere 
(1)  The problems affecting Stabex during the Second Lome Convention, especially its inability to 
meet claims in  full  in  1981  and  1982 are analysed  in  Chapter IV of this document. 
17 roll-over or updating of the resources earmarked for the Lome II  Con-
vention will not be enough. The Community must increase its financial 
assistance to the ACP states in spite of its own financial and economic 
problems. This is not only because such «Solidarity» is necessary from 
the moral point of view. The Commission stresses that the world economic 
recovery will depend on the Third World's ability to buy from the West. 
There can be no lasting global recovery unless the South can increase 
its purchasing power. The North and the South need each other, now 
even more than in the past. 
The Commission recognises that its attempts to forge a new relationship 
with the ACP states will run into problems. The present state of the inter-
national economy is hardly conducive to change and innovation. But a 
great deal is at stake.  Europe needs the new Convention because its 
development policy helps shape its own identity; because a part of its 
strength in international affairs comes from its special relations with the 
Third World; because it depends on the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
states for an important share of its raw material supplies and as a market 
for its manufactured goods. 
The ACP countries, for their part, need the Convention because if they 
cannot count on the Community they will face problems in finding a new 
partner willing to come up with a negotiated, contractually-based, lasting 
and politically neutral system of development cooperation. 
This is no time for cheap compromises. A Convention which simply rolls 
over the present agreement will not be able to meet the development re-
quirements of the ACP states. What is needed is a new cooperation policy 
with self-sufficiency as its goal. Unless such a policy is introduced most 
African and some Caribbean and Pacific countries, will sink back into 
the paralysis of increasing dependance, malnutrition, debt and uncon-
trolled rural exodus. The new Convention must ensure that this does not 
happen. 
i8 CHAPTER TWO 
THE COMMUNITY AND 
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE 
19 .. 26 The North·South Dialogue 
This is the somewhat inappropriate title chosen to designate the wide 
variety of negotiations taking place at very different levels on the pro-
blems of world development. Many of these occur within the framework 
of United Nations institutions. The participants are the industrialised coun-
tries of the North-West (the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are often 
absent from the negotiations) and the developing countries of the South. 
One major attempt has been  made to relauch the global North-South 
dialogue which was suspended in June 1977, with little to show for 18 
months of discussions. This was the Summit meeting held in Cancun, 
Mexico in October 1981. At the very beginning, the industrialised coun-
tries- particularly the United States- tried to use the North-South dialogue 
to obtain supply and price guarantees for oil and gas from the petroleum 
exporting countries. The countries of the Third World, for their part, wanted 
more stable mechanisms for their exports of raw materials, the cancella-
tion or rescheduling of part of their debts and better access to technologies 
developed by the industrialised nations. Neither side obtained much of 
what it wanted. It took four years before an  attempt could be made to 
relaunch the global negotiations at Cancun. 
There,  20  representatives  of the  developing  countries  and  eight  in-
dustrialised nations made a vain bid to restart the dialogue. A large part 
of the responsibility for the failure of Cancun lies with the intransigent 
attitude of the United States. The Reagan administration believes the best 
policy for developing countries is for them to open their frontiers to more 
direct foreign investment and to integrate their economies into the free-
trade system of the capitalist world. 
The United States, less dependent on imported raw materials than the 
European  Community or Japan,  also  prefers a  bilateral  approach to 
development cooperation over multilateral negotiations. In addition, and 
this represents a significant change in the American attitude, the Reagan 
administration has shown many times that it considers North-South rela-
tions to be an  extention of East-West strategic rivalries. 
Another significant factor for the failure to restart the dialogue has been 
the less dominant role of energy in  North-South relations. Energy pro-
blems, stemming from the first oil price shock of 1973/74 served as the 
catalyst which brought North and South together in the first place. This 
is no longer a likely scenario. Energy-saving measures in the industrialised 
countries coupled with the fall in demand resulting from the recession 
and the development of non-OPEC sources have combined to change 
the balance on the world energy market. Whereas OPEC production still 
represented 51 o;o  of world output in 1977, this figure was down to 36% 
by 1982. The risk of a third oil shock, though still possible, has receded 
for the time being. 
The impossibility of relaunching the dialogue in present conditions was 
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underlined by the sixth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in Belgrade in June 1983. The conference 
produced meagre results.  Differences between the industrialised and 
developing countries prevented meaningful progress on the main issues 
of consolidating economic recovery, trade, finance or raw materials. On 
some specific points, differences appeared among the western industrialis-
ed countries themselves, in particular between the Community and the 
United States. 
This meant that once again a chance was lost to introduce more stability 
and a greater degree of predictability in North-South trade (see Chapter 
Three of this document). The same is true of the problem of stability of 
raw materials prices and security of supply (Chapter Four). Nor did the 
conference bring any nearer a solution the problem of Third World finances 
and debt. On the contrary, this problem has worsened without any in-
dustrialised country (of West or East) giving a commitment to increase 
its aid contribution to the developing world (see Chapter Five below). 
The Community is now using the occasion of the Lome negotiations of 
1983/84 to realise on a regional level some of the aims of its global North-
South strategy. But this effort has predetermined limits : for the Com-
munity cannot alone aspire to creating an international economic order 
at a time when all around is disorder. 
But the global dialogue should go on 
Nonetheless, the European Community, while adapting its development 
policies to this new set of circumstances and while continuing its own 
specific efforts on behalf of the Third World, still supports a global dialogue 
between the industrialised countries of the north of the planet and the 
developing nations in the south. It believes a multilateral framework is 
required to tackle the interrelated development issues of finance, trade, 
raw materials, food production. But the Community also believes that each 
of the key North-South issues should be discussed in its appropriate ex-
isting  forum  rather than  creating  a  new one.  Thus the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, Gatt, the UNCTAD Common Fund 
for  commodity  agreements,  structures  like  the  Paris  Club  for  debt 
rescheduling, etc, each have an important role to play. But if the Com-
munity considers existing organisations as the rightful place for further 
North-South negotiations, it is also aware that in some cases their work-
ing methods could be improved. 
The Community favours more autonomy in the development of Third World 
economies  since  self-reliance  helps  reduce  excessive  external 
dependence. In this context, the promotion of technological exchanges 
and preferential trading arrangements within the Third World (South-South 
cooperation) are steps towards a wider and more universal system of 
cooperation. 
22 The Community priorities 
What are the Community's priorities among the constituent elements in 
a global North-South dialogue ? 
1.  The first is a short-term one :to consolidate the nascent economic 
recovery so that both North and South can benefit. It is clear that 
during the recession the continued economic activity and the im-
port  capacity of developing countries  helped  offset for a  con-
siderable time the stagnating or falling demand at home for the 
industrialised nations. Equally, there is no doubt that recovery in 
the  advanced  countries  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  the 
economies of the Third World. Unless the developing countries 
participate in any economic recovery, it will be impossible to create 
the conditions for lasting economic growth in the industrialised 
countries themselves. 
For economic conditions have changed fundamentally. Recovery 
in the industrialised countries is no longer enough in itself to en-
sure worldwide growth. The depth of the crisis affecting the Third 
World is a result of a combination of external and internal factors. 
Adjustments need to be made by the developing countries in their 
domestic policies. For their part, the members of the Community 
are pledged to follow economic and industrial policies that foster 
non-inflationary growth, to reduce budget deficits and thereby bring 
down interest rates,  to promote productive investments and to 
maintain as open a world trading system as  possible. 
2.  Raw  materials :  the Community is  committed to  efforts  in  the 
multilateral North-South framework which bring more stability to 
raw material prices, more predictability in  matching supply and 
demand and which increase the role of producer countries in pro-
cessing and exporting their commodities. The collapse of com-
modity prices during the recession, although there are some signs 
of recovery now, came as a major setback for many developing 
countries, particularly those dependent on one or two products 
for their export earnings. The recession highlighted problems that 
have been developing over a period of years but which had been 
masked by the strength of markets and the relative stability of world 
prices. These include the development of industrial substitutes 
for some raw materials,  more economical use of products and 
technical progress. 
The Community is ready to take part actively in  negotiations on 
individual world commodity agreements foreseen but not yet under-
taken  in  the framework o·f  the Integrated Programme for com-
modities first agreed by UNCTAD in  1976 and to participate on 
the relevent management boards to review the working of existing 
agreements and assess room for improvements. But it is against 
the notion put forward by the Group of 77 on behalf of the Third 
23 World (1) in April 1983 which called for immediate ad hoc action 
to negotiate provisional agreements or temporary arrangements 
for a number of commodities not yet covered by the Integrated 
Programme. The Community's preference is to speed up negotia-
tions currently under way so that definitive new agreements can 
be concluded as soon as possible without getting side-tracked into 
interim arrangements that would only delay final agreements. While 
the Community favours a greater role for the developing countries 
in the processing and marketing of their commodities, these ac-
tivities must be economically viable. They should not affect the 
security of the consumer nations' raw materials supplies. 
3.  Finance, debt and aid : The alarming level of developing coun-
tries' debts, nearing 700 billion dollars at mid-1983 if short-term 
credits are included, is partly a result of external factors. Their 
balance of payments deficits have swelled in recent years because 
of major currency fluctuations, a fall in their export earnings and 
higher import prices, including those of energy. But their level of 
indebtedness is also due in part to the internal policies of develop-
ing countries, some of whom borrowed in pre-recession years to 
finance non-productive needs. International commercial banks will-
ingly continued to lend to developing countries long after prudential 
credit limits had been reached. 
For  this  variety  of  reasons,  the  developing  countries  find 
themselves hobbled by huge debt servicing payments (running 
at about 130 billion dollars a year) which are depriving them of 
vital  resources for their economic development. 
Despite the excessive debt levels of some Third World countries 
an adequate flow of financial resources is as necessary as ever 
for their economic survival. But present problems are not just a 
result of a shortage of liquidities which massive financial transfers 
to  the  Third  World  would  solve.  The  re-focussing  of  certain 
domestic policies by debtor nations is also required. 
The Community believes the existing multilateral institutions such 
as the IMF, the World Bank and the Paris Club are best adapted 
for tackling the debt problems. In their work to date on reschedul-
ing developing country debts and in avoiding a major default, these 
organisations have responded with the necessary flexibility to meet 
individual circumstances. Debt problems should therefore go on 
being dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate in-
stitutions.  In  this way, debt rescheduling arrangements can be 
tailored to the particular situation of each debtor country. Govern-
ment authorities and private sector institutions in the industrialis-
ed nations will have to cooperate with commercial banks in cop-
(1)  In the so-called  Buenos Aires Platform,  adopted at the fifth  Ministerial meeting of the Group 
of 77 (Buenos Aires,  28 March - 9 April  1983). 
24 ing with the problem of their excessive exposure to Third World 
borrowers. For its part, the Community could consider specific 
measures, again on  a  case-by-case basis, for easing the debt 
burden of the least developed countries. 
In addition to short-term debt problems, the Community supports 
a variety of initiatives to increase financial flows to the develop-
ing countries. Again the multilateral agencies play an important 
role. Access to IMF facilities has been broadened and World Bank 
structural adjustment loans have been made more widely available. 
The IMF has decided to increase its quotas in  response to the 
needs of the developing countries and funds available for payments 
support under the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) have 
been considerably strengthened. The extra liquidity was to be 
available at end-1983, two years ahead of schedule. 
The Community backs efforts to increase private capital flows to 
the  developing  countries,  particularly in  the form  of direct  in-
vestments.  Here a  better investment climate in  host countries 
would be a considerable advantage. It also accords considerable 
priority to the development of indigenous energy resources by non-
oil developing countries to reduce their external dependence on 
high-cost imported oil. 
The Community remains the biggest single donor of financial aid 
to the Third World. In 1982, it granted aid worth 12.1  billion dollars, 
or 44% of the total given by the western industrialised countries 
which belong to the OECD's Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC). The Community's aid represented 0.53% of the ten 
Member States gross national product (GNP). 
The quality of its aid as well as the amount is an important issue 
for the Community.  It is trying to make its official development 
assistance more effective, by seeking to give more direct support 
for certain  sectors of development such as human resources, 
energy and food production. This means less Community aid will 
be spent on large-scale industrial projects in developing countries, 
although this could  lead to a  reduction  in  export contracts for 
Europe's own capital goods industry. 
4.  Trade problems : The Community has always been the trading 
power most open to exports from developing countries. Its average 
customs duties are lower than those of any other industrialised 
countries. Despite economic problems, it will continue to pursue 
a policy of allowing the developing countries access to its markets. 
The growth of Third World exports to the Community has slowed 
down in recent years but is still positive whereas trade among in-
dustrialised countries has stagnated or declined. An expansion 
of world trade, to the benefit of all, depends on the maintenance 
of an open multilateral trading system based on Gatt rules. 
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In recent years the Community has carried out structural reform 
in a number of industrial sectors, such as textiles and steel where 
Community firms have lost the comparative advantage to more 
cost-effective Third World producers. But the North-South dimen-
sion is only one aspect of the problem. Adjustments have also been 
brought about by technological innovation and changes in the 
nature of markets and demand structures. Among the advanced 
countries themselves, major shifts in comparative advantage are 
continually taking place, with direct consequences on employment 
levels. Yet the Community continues its efforts to carry out struc-
tural  adjustments in  various  industrial  sectors.  The degree of 
government intervention, although it varies from one member state 
to another, is limited. 
It is declared Community policy not to retain any longer than is 
strictly necessary the restrictive commercial policy measures taken 
to limit the damage caused by certain imports of sensitive items. 
At the Williamsburg economic summit in May 1983, the Community 
(and the other market-economy industrialised powers) agreed to 
reverse protectionist trends as economic recovery grew firmer. The 
Community aims to participate actively in the search for a solu-
tion in Gatt to the problems of the safeguard clause. The safeguard 
mechanism in Gatt, as it stands, forces Gatt members to take pro-
tective action against all suppliers of a specific product even if 
it is only one exporting country that is disrupting their domestic 
market. 
Although not immune to protectionist pressures itself, the Com-
munity remains committed to an open multilateral trading system. 
It will try to ensure that its own commercial policy complies with 
world trading rules and principles, including those that provide for 
special preferential treatment in favour of the developing coun-
tries. Gatt has played a positive and important role in expanding 
world trade. The Community believes that the Newly Industrialis-
ing Countries (NICs) should «graduate» to full Gatt status, by ac-
cepting all the rights but also the responsibilities for maintaining 
an open trading system. Despite their strong export performance, 
most  of  them  maintain  restrictive  import  policies.  The  Ten 
recognise,  however, that given the massive indebtedness and 
payments deficits of these countries, full  integration could only 
come about in  very gradual stages. 
5.  Problems of the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) : These are 
one of the top priorities of the EC's development policy and as 
such should be a central theme for North-South cooperative ef-
forts. The LLDCs are at the other end of the development spec-
trum from the NICs which are held up by one school of develop-
ment strategists, particularly strong in the United States, as pro-
of that self-reliance and the harnessing of market forces offer the 
best development formula for the Third World as a whole. But the LLDCs are poorly equipped to absorb external shocks and actively 
to adjust their economies to changing world conditions. They are 
so poorly endowed with natural resources and human skills that 
there is no foundation on which they can base a self-help strategy. 
As Development Commissioner Edgard Pisani stressed at the Paris 
Conference on the LLDCs in September 1981  : 
«To expect their salvation as a result of the benevolent work-
ing of market mechanisms or commercial activity is to be uto-
pian or fraudulent». 
Because it is itself hit by the recession and its resources are more 
limited than they used to be,  the Community is obliged to help 
first  and  foremost those  countries most urgently in  need,  the 
LLDCs. The United nations lists 36, of which 27 are ACP coun-
tries and the remaining nine are in Asia and Latin America. The 
LLDCs do 35-40°/o of their trade with the Community which is their 
main trading  partner.  Nearly 400/o  of total  EC aid  goes to the 
LLDCs. The poorest countries which belong to the ACP group are 
privileged  by the  mechanisms of the  Lome  Convention  - with 
respect to direct financial aid (56% of total disbursements), and 
access to Community financing to offset losses of raw materials 
export earnings (through the Stabex and Sysmin mechanisms). 
Other LLDCs have had special treatment under the Community's 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) since 1977. They are 
entitled to unlimited duty-free acces for all their manufactured ex-
ports,  including textiles,  and  also  enjoy duty-free entry for  all 
agricultural products covered by the GSP, including those for which 
ceilings or quotas are in  force.  The Community's food  aid and 




TRADE RELATIONS WITH 
THE THIRD WORLD 
29  ,_.  :30 World Trade slows down 
Trade has been the principal motor of Third World economic develop-
ment and privileged access to the Community market for developing coun-
tries' exports is  a cornerstone of the EC's relations with them. This is 
why all Third World nations, those which have formal trading links with 
the Ten and those which do not, are able to export the bulk of their goods 
to the EC on preferential terms. For the ACP group of countries, the con-
ditions of their privileged trade relations are set out in the Lome Conven-
tion. Similar provisions are contained in the individual trade and coopera-
tion agreements between the Community and the countries of the south 
Mediterranean seaboard. Exports from developing nations without for-
mal trading links with the Community are covered by the EC's Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP). 
In line with the stagnation and downturn of world trade in 1981 and 1982, 
the growth of Community trade with the developing countries slowed down 
dramatically. For the first time since the end of World War Two, the volume 
of world trade actually fell (by 2%) in 1982. The fall in global Third World 
exports, which began for the oil-exporting countries in 1981, spread to 
the other developing countries in 1982. The value of the exports of this 
latter group dropped by 5% in value in 1982 while their imports fell by 10%. 
There are two interconnected causes at the root of this trend. One is the 
recession in the Community and the other industrialised countries, which 
has cut their demand for imports in general. This means in turn that the 
developing countries have experienced a fall in their export revenues and 
therefore in their ability to pay for imported goods and services which 
are vital for their overall development. The second cause is the level of 
indebtedness of a number of d•3veloping countries. For a while, they were 
able to go on borrowing heavily even after it was clear that the world was 
sliding into recession. They are now in a position where, unable to ex-
pand their exports and unable to borrow any further, they are having to 
cut back on  imports in  order to service their greatly increased debts. 
The importance of trade with the developing countries. 
As far as EC-Third World trade is concerned, the growth rate in Ecu terms 
eased from 25% in 1980 to 21% in 1981  and just over 2% in 1982. The 
slow-down was even more dramatic in terms of the US dollar which has 
strengthened considerably since 1980. Already in  1981, trade between 
the Community and the developing countries actually fell by more than 
7% in  dollar terms. 
Table I shows that mainly as a result of a drop in oil purchases from OPEC 
members, the Community actually bought less from the developing coun-
tries as a whole in  1982 than in  1981. Exports to the Third World grew 




EC-THIRD WORLD TRADE - 1978-1982 (in bn Ecu's) 
1978  1979  1980  1981 
Ex.  lm.  Ex.  lm.  Ex.  lm.  Ex.  lm. 
All. dev. countries  66.5  71.2  69.7  88.2  83.4  114.3  112.0  129.1 
Non-oil devel. countries  35.0  32.4  39.0  35.5  45.8  47.1  58.5  53.7 
OPEC  31.5  38.8  30.7  52.7  36.6  67.2  53.5  75.4 
ACP  12.8  12.0  11.9  14.9  15.7  18.9  18.5  16.4 
Latin America  11.0  10.9  12.4  13.2  14.2  16.0  18.0  18.7 
Asean  3.9  4.3  4.4  5.5  5.3  6.9  7.1  6.6 
China  1.5  0.9  2.1  1.3  1.7  1.9  1.9  2.3 
India  1.9  1.6  2.0  1.8  2.3  1.8  3.4  1.9 
Memo item: 
Total Extra-EC  173.8  178.3  194.2  218.2  218.8  272.9  266.7  303.8 
trade 
Source : Eurostat. 
1982 
Ex.  lm. 
117.1  128.8 
61.5  57.0 
55.6  71.8 
18.2  17.8 
16.2  20.7 
8.4  7.1 
2.0  2.3 
4.0  2.6' 
286.5  321.5 
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0 About 40% of EC external trade (that is, excluding trade between member 
states), is carried out with the Third World. The actual trend is strongly 
influenced by fluctuations in the oil price. Community imports from the 
Third World peaked at 41,9% of total imports from outside in 1980 and 
42.5% in 1981. They fell back to 40.1% in 1982, their lowest level in five 
years. Exports by the EC to the developing countries showed the same 
trend, although the fall in 1982 was less dramatic. The Third World ac-
counted for 38,1% of external EC exports in  1980, 42.00/o in 1981  and 
40.9% in 1982. 
Besides its inevitable deficit with the OPEC countries, the Community 
also runs a regular trade deficit with the NICs of South-East Asia as well 
as with Latin America. It is in  regular surplus, on the other hand, with 
the Arab states of the Maghreb and Mashreq and with India. The Com-
munity's previous deficit with the ACP countries is  no longer a perma-
nent feature of EC-ACP trade. The Community has run a surplus with 
the members of the Lome Convention for three out of the past five years. 
The complementary nature of EC-Third World Trade 
The bulk of developing countries exports (80.40/o  in  1982) are concen-
trated in the sectors of mineral fuels, agricultural and mineral raw materials 
and food. In 1982, manufactured goods represented 16.90/o of Community 
purchases from the Third World. This pattern is the mirror image of what 
the EC sells to the developing countries. Manufactured goods accounted 
for no less than 79.50/o of Community exports. 
This complementarity of EC-Third World trade has changed little over 
the years. Raw materials, fuel and food made up 80.1% of Third World 
exports to the EC in 1970, three years before the first oil price explosion, 
and  manufactured  goods  17,5%.  Similarly,  manufactured  goods ac-
counted for 86.6% of Community exports to developing countries in 1970, 
the main factor in the fall over the past 12 years being a reduction in the 
share of Community exports taken by chemical products. 
If the shares of non-manufactured and manufactured exports to the Com-
munity by the Third World have remained relatively steady, despite sharp 
oil prices rises, shifts have taken place within the non-manufactured sec-
tor. The most significant of these has been a rise in the share of mineral 
fuels (from 40°/o in 1970 to 61% in  1982) and falls in the share of both 
food and non-food raw materials. The former accounted for 23% of Third 
World sales to the Community in  1970 and only 12.6% 12 years later. 
Non-food raw materials saw their share decline even more sharply, from 
17.6% in  1970 to 7% in  1982. 
These changes reflect a number of factors. Among the most significant, 
is a decline in  the growth rate of food production on the part of certain 
developing countries. Another important factor has been a shift by Com-
munity members states away from Third World sources of raw materials, 
33 mainly (but not only) metals, towards sources in other industrialised coun-
tries where supply security, for political as well as economic reasons, was 
deemed greater. 
Although the developing countries as a whole have been able to increase 
their exports of manufactured goods to the EC at the same rate as non-
TABLE II 
EC-THIRD WORLD TRADE IN  MANUFACTURES 
1977 AND 1982 
(in  billion Ecu's) 
1977  1982  %  change 
ECIMPORTS 
Extra EC  60.9  116.2  90.8 
Third World  11.2  21.7  93.7 
ACP  1.3  1.7  26.9 
OPEC  0.6  1.3  118.0 
Latin America  1.7  3.2  82.8 
India  1.0  1.35  35.0 
China  0.4  1.13  210.0 
South Korea  1  .1  2.3  104.2 
Taiwan  0.9  2.3  158.4 
Hong Kong  1.9  3.8  96.2 
Brazil  0.6  1.4  143.5 
EC  EXPORTS 
Extra EC  118.2  194.1  64.4 
Third World  46.0  82.4  79.1 
ACP  9.1  11.8  29.7 
OPEC  23.6  41.1  73.9 
Latin America  7.2  9.0  24.2 
India  1.0  2.8  189.5 
China  0.5  1.2  148.9 
South Korea  0.5  0.8  53.0 
Taiwan  0.3  1.0  233.0 
Hong Kong  0.8  2.3  172.2 
Brazil  0.5  1.8  280.0 
Source : Eurostat. 
34 manufactures, individual Third World regions have benefitted to widely 
differing degrees. In 1982, 400/o of the Community's imports of Third World 
manufactured goods came from only three countries: Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan. The ACP states between them accounted for only 7%. 
The ACP countries' share of the EC's global imports of manufactureds 
goods has declined steadily in recent years- from 1.3% in 1976 to 0.80/o 
in  1979 and 0.55% in  1982. 
The picture is somewhat different where EC exports of manufactures are 
concerned. The three South-East Asian NICs represented only 5% of 
Community sales of manufactured goods to the Third World. This is largely 
because, in line with other NICs, with the exception of Hong Kong, they 
tend to protect their domestic market against competing manufactures 
from outside. Another contributory factor is the large share of EC exports 
of manufactures to the Third World going to the OPEC countries, which 
took 50°/o of the total in 1982. ACP countries accounted for 14% of EC 
manufactured exports to the developing world, double their share of Com-
munity imports. Table II  gives the breakdown of EC-Third World trade 
in manufactured items, comparing the 1982 figures with those of five years 
previously. The slow growth in EC-ACP manufactured trade is a particular-
ly striking feature. 
The limits of export-led growth as development strategy 
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen how the world recession of 
the early 1980s has served to underscore the limits of the role trade can 
play in development strategy. The Community's policy (and that of the 
other industrialised countries) based on export-led growth as the quickest 
way of inserting developing countries into the world economy has been 
only partially successful.  It  has worked for the NICs, countries which 
already in the 1960s were on the threshold of industrialisation. Encouraged 
politically and  financially by the advanced  nations through  loans,  in-
vestments and tariff preferences, they have followed export-led growth 
policies, concentrating first on textiles, clothing and footwear and then 
moving into the production of electronic components and basic sectors 
of heavy industry such as steel and shipbuilding. 
But there has been no parallel movement on the part of the NICs, despite 
urging from the industrialised countries, to open up their own markets 
for goods from the advanced nations and other Third World exporters. 
The resistance of the NICs to the notion of «graduating•• to full trading 
status with the same obligations and responsibilities for free trade as the 
advanced countries has been reinforced by their present debt problems. 
At a time when they need to boost exports and reduce imports in order 
to service their debts, few, if any, place import liberalisation high on their 
list of economic priorities. 
The recession and the successive oil price shocks have not only slowed 
demand in the industrialised countries they have also limited their capacity 
35 to restructure their industries to make room for the expanding manufac-
tured exports from the NICs. Increasingly, textiles, footwear, electronic 
goods and steel from the NICs have seen their access to the markets 
of the industrialised countries subjected to restrictions. 
Their sales to the Community have come under a series of controls that 
have become stricter in the past few years : tighter restrictions for the 
NICs in the framework of the Multi-fibre Arrangement for textiles, self-
limitation agreements for steel and a series of national controls by EC 
member states for footwear and electronic equipment. The access to the 
EC market for these ccsensitive» products from the NICs under the Com-
munity's Generalised System of Preferences is also subject to strict quan-
titative limits. Despite the EC's continued commitment to free trade, it 
has had to intervene to prevent imports of these items reaching propor-
tions that put in jeopardy its capacity to restructure its industry and ad-
just to the changes in the international division of labour. 
The strategy of export-led growth has also helped a group of second-
generation NICs to develop their industrial base. They have followed the 
NICs in creating labour-intensive industries while the NICs themselves 
have moved into more capital-intensive or skill-intensive sectors. But given 
the frictions that have emerged in trade between the industrialised coun-
tries  and  the first-generation  NICs,  and the  likelihood that the world 
economy has entered a  period of slower growth than in the past, the 
newcomers will  not enjoy the same access to the  markets of the  in-
dustrialised countries as enjoyed by the NICs until recently. 
Significant trade-induced growth has remained beyond the reach of many 
low-income developing countries and a  number of primary-producing 
middle-income ones as well. These countries did not have the stf·uctures 
or skills to allow them  to take  part in  the booming world  market for 
manufactures that lasted throughout the 1960s and most of the\  1970s. 
They have also suffered an additional drawback in that the prices of most 
of their raw materials have either declined in real terms or increased more 
slowly than those of oil or manufactured goods. 
The low-income Third World nations as a group accounted for 5.60/o  of 
world trade in 1955. This share has declined steadily over the years and 
has fallen to less than 20/o  since 1980. 
Trade between the Community and the ACP countries 
It is to the ACP countries that the Community has granted the most com-
prehensive trade preferences. The 63 members of the Lome Convention 
(which include 27 of the 36 states which figure on the United Nations 
list of least developed countries (LLDCs)), have unlimited duty-free ac-
cess for all products, except for a few agricultural items on which reduc-
ed rates of duty are applied. The overall trends in EC-ACP trade is heavily 
influenced by the role of Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, and the 
36 Community's fourth largest outside source of crude oil.(1) Nigeria's share 
of trade between the ACP countries and the Community reached 400/o 
in 1980 but fell to 38°/o  in 1981  and 37% in 1982, largely as a result of 
lower oil deliveries and a corresponding reduction in  Nigerian imports 
of capital and consumer goods from the Ten. The structure of EC-ACP 
trade is given in  Table Ill. 
Table Ill 
TRADE OF THE COMMUNITY WITH THE ACP COUNTRIES 
BY MAIN COMMODITY CLASSES 
Mrd ECU 
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(I)  On  the basis of 1982 statistics. 
37 The chart shows that mineral fuels remained far and away the biggest 
category of imports from ACP countries accounting for 46% of the total 
in 1982. Food, drink and tobacco made up a further 250/o and raw materials 
15%. Both mineral fuels and food and drink showed above-average in-
creases of 160/o over 1981. Raw materials shipments to the Community 
declined slightly,  reflecting the impact of the recession  on  European 
markets. Manufactured exports from the EC to the ACP countries declined 
in  1982, but together with chemical products,which grew slightly, they 
accounted for nearly 75% of Community sales to the Lome group. 
The Mediterranean countries 
Oil and natural gas dominate the Community's imports from the coun-
tries of the South Mediterranean seaboard which have individual trade 
and  cooperation  agreements  with  the  Community.  The  1980-1982 
breakdown  between  the  Maghreb  countries  (Morocco,  Algeria  and 
Tunisia), the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) and 
Israel is given in Table IV. Over 700/o of total EC imports from the region 
are composed of oil and gas from Algeria and Egypt. The decline in im-
ports from the Mashreq in  1982 is  due largely to the reduction  in  oil 
shipments from Egypt, in line with tower EC oil imports generally. The 
strong expansion of Maghreb exports on the other hand reflects increased 
imports of natural gas from Algeria by Community members, in line with 
Community policy of diversifying out of oil  into other energy sources. 
TABLE IV 
EC TRADE WITH MAGHREB, MASHREQ &  ISRAEL 
1980-1982 
(in  billion Ecus) 
IMPORT  EXPORT 
1980  1981  1982  1980  1981  1982 
Maghreb  6.3  8.5  11.3  7.7  9.3  9.5 
Mashreq  2.7  4.6  3.8  6.0  8.4  8.9 
Israel  1.6  i .7  i .8  1.7  2.2  2.5 
Source : Eurostat. 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, whose access to the EC  market for sen-
sitive textile products is already restricted,as well as Israel, have repeatedly 
warned that the entry of Spain and Portugal to the Community will have 
38 a negative impact on their exports of agricultural goods and manufac-
tures to the Community unless specific action is taken.  This issue is 
discussed in  detail in  Chapter VI  of the present document. 
Just over 75°/o of EC exports to the Maghreb and Mashreq countries con-
sists of manufactured products. The share of foodstuffs in the Communi-
ty's exports to the Arab countries of the Southern Mediterranean rose 
from 10% in 1978 to 150fo  in  1981  and 1982. This reflects the growing 
importance of these countries as outlets for Community cereals, dairy 
and meat products (particularly poultry). 
The non-associated countries and the EC's Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) 
Even  without its  Generalised System of Preferences, the Community 
allows in a higher proportion of manufactured goods from the Third World 
free of duty than other industrialised countries. The Community accords 
duty-free Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status to 67.90/o of its imports from 
the developing world against 21.5% granted by the United States and 
18.7% by Japan. The EC's GSP gives duty-free access to a further 20.1% 
of imports from the Third World. The corresponding figures for the United 
States  and  Japan  are  19.6% and  6.1 o;o  respectively.  As betokens a 
scheme  destined  to  promote  the  export-oriented  industrialisation  of 
developing countries, it is the NICs and other semi-industrialised coun-
tries that have benefitted most from the Community's GSP. The top 12 
beneficiaries in 1981  accounted for 75°/o of all goods imported into the 
EC under the GSP arrangements. Ti1e  remaining 45 beneficiaries, i.e. 
excluding Lome or Mediterranean countries with their own preferential 
agreements with the EC, accounted for only 250/o  of GSP imports. The 
main beneficiaries with their total GSP shipments to the Community are 
listed in Table V.  However, of total goods eligible for GSP treatment from 
Third World beneficiariesonly 8.1 bn Ecus out of a total of 21.5bn actual-
ly received GSP treatment. This is because of limits applied to certain 
sensitive items by the Community as well as the non-fulfilment of origin 
requirements by some suppliers. In addition, despite more than 10 years 
of operation not all Third World suppliers or Community importers are 
familiar with GSP procedures. 
Although the Community's GSP is geared first and foremost to the more 
advanced nations of the Third World it has special mechanisms destin-
ed to favour the Least Developed Countries. The LLDCs are, for instance, 
not subject to any quantitative restrictions on their textile exports to the 
Community. Of the other Third World members, states which have con-
cluded bilateral self-limitation agreements with the EC have received duty-
free ceilings for their textile shipments to the Ten. Other GSP beneficiaries 
do not normally qualify for preferential access. The Commission has pro-
posed for 1983 and 1984 that the LLDCs receive special preferential treat-
ment for certain agricultural products, although this has not been accepted 
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PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES OF COMMUNITY'S GSP 
(1981) 
Value 
Beneficiaries  (milions Ecus) 
1.  Rumania  797.2 
2.  Brazil  740.3 
3.  Venezuela  609.7 
4.  Hong Kong  589.8 
5.  China  589.2 
6.  India  582.3 
7.  South Korea  563.0 
8.  Saudi Arabia  382.8 
9.  Malaysia  371.0 
10.  Singapore  296.9 
11.  Thailand  267.2 
12.  Argentina  249.0 
(in the case of 1983) by the Council of Ministers. Notwithstanding this 
problem, the Community accords nearly three quarters of all GSP benefits 
going to the developing countries. 
In January 1981, the Community renewed its GSP for a further 10 years, 
setting out in some detail its structure for the 1981-85 period. This main-
tained the main characteristics of the system of the previous decade with 
improved preferential margins for up to 36 agricultural products, and with 
the LLDCs being granted duty-free access for several additional products. 
The administration of the scheme for industrialised products was simplified 
by limiting products to two categories: sensitive and non-sensitive. Sen-
sitive products are subject to individual country quotas and ceilings, while 
non-sensitive products are subject to statistical control. The change was 
also aimed at increasing the transparency of the Community scheme. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COMMUNITY AND  NORTH-SOUTH  RAW 
MATERIALS PROBLEMS 
41  ... '-/Z.. The Third World commodity crisis 
Commodity-producing nations in the Third World have spent the last few 
years trying to survive in a world where prices for their exports have either 
fluctuated wildly or fallen to unprecedented depths. This is largely due 
to overproduction of tropical commodities in the South, combined with 
recession-provoked weak demand in the traditional commodity markets 
of the North. 
The future for most commodity-producing Third World nations, especial-
ly those who depend almost exclusively on exports of one particular com-
modity, gives considerable cause for concern. International commodity 
experts stress that the situation  is  unlikely to improve in  the coming 
decade, despite operations aimed at stabilising commodity prices mounted 
by UNCTAD (the Integrated Programme for Commodities), or export short-
fall compensation schemes drawn up by the International Monetary Fund 
(compensatory financing facility) and the EC (system for the stabilisation 
of export earnings - Stabex). 
The seriousness of the crisis facing Third World commodity producers 
has been underlined in recent documents drawn up by the European Com-
mission and UNCTAD. In a report (1) in preparation for UNCTAD VI, the 
Commission points out that prospects for a sustained increase in world 
prices for the major tropical products (coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar) in the 
next decade are ccgloomy». The extention of acreages by producer coun-
tries when commodity prices were high in the second half of the 1970s 
has led to medium-term surpluses of supply over demand. «If this fun-
damental imbalance persists», warns the Commission,  ccit  is clear that 
the international agreements (sponsored by UNCTAD) will find it difficult 
to prevent prices from falling in real terms». 
The  UNCTAD  Trade  and  Development  Report  1982  agrees.  It  also 
stresses that ccany significant improvement in the prospects for the terms 
of trade or export volumes of primary commodities in the short term would 
require a resumption of buoyant growth in the developed market-economy 
countries». 
The Integrated Programme for Commodities : poor results, 
sombre future 
Adopted in 1976 in Nairobi, the Integrated Programme for Commodities 
(I PC) has proved unable to handle the current commodity crisis. Despite 
the conclusion of seven commodity agreements (out of a total of 18 in-
(1)  Commission communication to the Council on  UNCTAD VI  COM  (82)  803 final. 
43 eluded in the programme), and the decision to create the Common Fund, 
the IPC has been unable to meet its main objectives : 
to provide Third World commodity producing countries with fair 
and remunerative prices for their exports; 
to attenuate excessive fluctuations in  commodity prices and 
stabilise supplies in the interests of producers and consumers; 
to  stabilise  and  improve  the  export  earnings  of  developing 
countries. 
The UNCTAD report concedes that the overall progress achieved so far 
falls significantly short of the expectations aroused by the adoption of 
the IPC and of what the developing countries need in order to play their 
full part as an  active and dynamic component of the world economy. 
The pessimism is widespread. Although experts concur that commodity 
markets need to be strengthened, few including the Commission place 
great confidence in  the IPC,  at least in the immediate future. 
To date, UNCTAD can point to only three major successes: the agree-
ment on the Common Fund, the conclusion of the International Rubber 
Agreement, and more recently, the decision to conclude the International 
Jute Agreement. Progress in discussions for other international pacts has 
been unsatisfactory and even agreements existing before the lPC (tin, 
coffee, cocoa, sugar and olive oil) have faced their share of problems, 
including the defection of major producers and consumers and a mark-
ed inability to stabilise world prices. Commodity producers and consumers 
have battled on a wide range of issues, including the size of buffer stocks, 
price levels, export quotas and the need for research and development 
measures. 
European Community participation in the IPC 
In  keeping with a decision taken by the Council of Ministers in  March 
1981, the Community and its Member States participate jointly in each 
IPC commodity agreement. A common Community-Member State delega-
tion expresses its joint position through one voice at all UNCTAD-hosted 
meetings. All  documents are signed jointly by the EC and its Member 
States. The decision puts an end to years of controversy surrounding the 
terms of European Community participation in this sector. The Community 
played a positive and constructive role during the discussions within UNC-
TAD for the conclusion of the different commodity agreements and the 
creation of the Common Fund. 
The decision to set up the ?50-million-dollar Common Fund was taken 
in June 1980 following four years of difficult and tortuous negotiations. 
Once the agreement setting up the Fund was open for signature, the Com-
munity Member States began to ratify the final documents and the EC 
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also became a fully-fledged member of the Fund on October 1981. The 
Fund will not, however, become operational before 1984 at the earliest, 
provided the required level of participation is attained by then. 
EC Member States contribute both to the Common Fund's «first account» 
(designed to stabilise commodity prices) and the «Second account» (the 
financing of research and development measures) : 
TABLE I 
MEMBER STATES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMON FUND 
(in  Ecu) 
First account  Second account 
Belgium  3,556,242  2,677,684 
Denmark  2,345,606  1,513,294 
France  15,178,342  11,349,707 
Greece  756,647  2,677,684 
Ireland  756,647  -
Italy  9,117,598  11,349,707 
Luxemburg  756,647  113,497 
Netherlands  4,456,652  12,463,001 
Germany  20,051 '149  21,431,082 
United Kingdom  11,425,372  7,571,902 
68,400,902  68,469,874 
In order to become really effective, the Common Fund must be backed 
up by the individual commodity agreements, of which as stated above, 
only seven are in force.  Discussions on the other eleven commodities 
included in the IPC are still bogged down in  Geneva. 
The EC has played an active role in the discussion and operations of ex-
isting agreements and promised to become a member of a new sugar 
pact. It has worked to bring producers and consumers together on a variety 
of issues by drawing up compromise formulae and has tried to persuade 
certain countries, such as the Ivory Coast and the United States to join 
the cocoa agreement. EC efforts facilitated the conclusion of the follow-
ing pacts: 
the sixth international Tin Agreement which entered into force 
on a provisional basis on July 1,  1982, despite the defection of 
the United States and Bolivia; 
the new International Cocoa Agreement which became opera-
45 tional in August 1981 despite a decision by the Ivory Coast- the 
leading cocoa producer- and the United States-the leading con-
sumer - to stay outside the pact. 
the international Coffee Agreement concluded in 1976 has now 
been extended until September 30,  1984. It is to be replaced 
by a new pact running for a six-year period as of October 1, 1984; 
olive oil : the current agreement concluded in 1979 replaces a 
pact which was initially concluded in  1963; 
the first-ever agreement to be concluded under the IPC was the 
International Rubber Agreement which entered into force on April 
15,  1982; 
the second such agreement under the IPC is the International 
Agreement on Jute and Jute products operative from July 1, 
1983; 
although the EC is not a party to the current International Sugar 
Agreement, it has promised to become a member of a new and 
improved sugar pact when it is renegotiated, on condition that 
it obtains satisfactory quota arrangements for its own production. 
The Community also continues to take an  active part in  international 
discussions on the other 11  commodities currently under way in Geneva, 
including tea, cotton, hard fibres, meat, tropical timber, bananas, cop-
per, iron ore,  manganese, bauxite and phosphates. 
AFRICA AND THE COMMODITY CRISIS 
Although the impact of the commodity crisis has been felt worldwide, 
African nations, most of whom depend on exports of one or two com-
modities, have been hardest hit by the recent price fluctuations. Most 
African countries, however, face an even more alarming long-term pro-
blem. Their share of world agricultural production and international com-
modity trade has begun to decline rapidly, especially in comparison with 
the dynamic performance of countries in  Latin America and Asia. This 
decline in production is due to a number of reasons, including an over-
emphasis on industrialisation, lack of investments in agriculture, inade-
quate pricing policies, political uncertainties, lack of trained farmers, etc. 
The Lome Convention's system for the stabilisation of ACP export earn-
ings (Stabex) was formulated to offset·- at least partially- the impact of 
the commodity crisis on most ACP states. Stabex- with financial resources 
totalling 550 million Ecu for the period 1981-85 - comes into action when 
ACP states are faced with sudden falls in their export earnings either 
because of fluctuations in world prices or because of variations in  na-
tional production. Transfers made by the system work to compensate ACP 
governments for any losses, based on traditional levels of trade, from 
46 exports sent to the EC (all destinations for the least developed states) 
for some 44 products or sub-products. The transfers made to the least 
developed ACP states are in the form of outright grants. All ACP reci-
pients have considerable discretion as to how they use Stabex transfers 
which means they are often not spent on trying to solve the problems 
of the sector for which they were disbursed in the first place. 
ST  ABEX : financial crisis : the problem 
Introduced in the Lome Convention to help stabilise ACP export earn-
ings, Stabex performed its tasks effectively and efficiently in the 1970s 
when world commodity prices were reasonably high so that ACP demands 
for assistance kept well within the annual ceilings fixed by the Convention. 
The situation changed dramatically in 1981 and 1982 because of a coali-
tion  of  negative  factors :  the  worldwide  recession  accentuated  the 
downward trend in prices, the structural decline in agricultural output ac-
celerated in certain regions, others were hit by drought. ACP demands 
for Stabex transfers rose well beyond the 110 million Ecu annual limit 
laid down in the Convention. ACP countries asked for compensation for 
export earning losses estimated at about 261  million Ecu in  1981  (for 
losses in 1980) and 453 million Ecu in 1982 (for losses in 1981). The bulk 
of the ACP losses in export revenues was due to the continuing deteriora-
tion  of the  market  for  coffee  and  cocoa,  despite the  existing  world 
agreements in both cases. 
The fact that both commodities had seen major price increases in  1976 
and 1977- and that these prices had been included in the reference price 
used by Stabex to calculate annual transfers - had a major impact on 
Stabex mechanisms.  It  meant that the high prices obtained on  world 
markets in both years were included in the calculation of the 7.50/o trig-
ger threshold for ACP Stabex claims for 1980 and 1981. Stabex was, 
therefore, in a way made to «pay» for sudden drop in  cocoa and coffee 
prices which followed the 1976/77 boom. The resulting claims for transfers 
made by the ACP were much higher than ever before in the system's 
history. 
The financial crisis facing Stabex drew attention to two factors : 
Stabex was initially seen as an instrument which would comple-
ment UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities and 
back-up the compensatory financing facility set up by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. It was not designed to cope practically 
singlehandedly with commodity price fluctuations or the resulting 
shortfall in export earnings. In order to function effectively, Stabex 
must be used in addition to price stabilisation mechanisms in-
cluded in international commodity agreements. Unless this hap-
pens, and if world commodity prices continue to fluctuate, Stabex 
risks facing similar financial difficulties in  the future. 
47 Stabex was not designed to tackle the structural production pro-
blems facing most African states.  Its five year budget of 550 
million Ecu was originally believed to be more than adequate 
to help ACP states confront fluctuations in export earnings caus-
ed by sudden declines in world commodity prices, a fall in de-
mand, or production shortfalls caused by natural disasters and 
climatic problems. Stabex cannot handle the wider-ranging pro-
blems of structural deterioration of African agricultural production. 
The solution : injection of extra funds 
Faced with ACP demands for Stabex transfers which were much higher 
than the annual ceilings written into the Lome Convention, EC and ACP 
ministers meeting in Luxembourg in April1981 agreed to draw 200/o from 
the next year of application and later, when this proved insufficient to 
meet requests, decided to resort to article 34 (2) of the Convention which 
authorises cutbacks in transfers if the system's financial resources pro-
ve inadequate. A total of 138 million Ecu was found in  1981  for Stabex 
funding, (by drawing on 1982 funds and from left-overs from the previous 
Convention), but this still fell  123 million Ecu short of ACP demands. 
Transfers were cut back by 40% for the least developed states and by 
520/o for the other ACP states. Transfers of less than 1 million Ecu were 
paid in full. 
The financial problems become even more acute in 1982. ACP demands 
for Stabex assistance for export earning shortfalls registered for 1981 
totalled 453 million Ecu. With only 90 million left in the annual budget, 
the Lome Convention members were forced once again to look for addi-
tional funds and to cutback transfers for the ACP states. 
Additional money was found through a series of «exceptional» measures 
and included 40 million Ecu taken from interest on  EDF assets and 30 
million Ecu taken from repayments of special loans made by Stabex in 
the past. In addition, an advance of 20% was made on the 1983 instal-
ment and a number of ACP countries which owed money to Stabex for 
transfers made in 1975 and 1976 agreed to give up their rights and to 
deduct their debts from the transfer claims in 1981. This brought the total 
amount of money available in 1982 for Stabex assistance to 182 million 
Ecu. As this was still not enough, cutbacks of 46% were agreed by the 
EC and ACP ambassadors for the least developed states and of 41 .9% 
for the other countries. Countries whose transfers totalled one million Ecu 
or less received the whole amount owed to them.(1) The crisis eased in 
1983, when claims for 1982 earnings losses dropped sharply as world 
commodity prices recovered. 
(1)  The breakdown of Stabex transfers in 1981  (for 1980) and  1982 (for 1981) are given in Tables 
4-A and 4-B  at  the end of this chapter. 
48 Evaluation- of Stabex operations 
The recurring financial crisis facing Stabex prompted the European Com-
mission to take a closer look at the system which both the ACP and the 
EC see as an essential element of the Lome Convention. Efforts to im-
prove the system under the new EC-ACP cooperation agreement which 
will replace Lome II  as of 1985 will undoubtedly be influenced by some 
of the points made by a the evaluation of Stabex operations carried out 
by the EC Commission.(1) 
The study which examined Stabex operations in ten countries (including 
five  major  recipients  of  Stabex  transfers  such  as  Senegal,  Sudan, 
Mauritania, Niger and Tanzania as well as Gambia, Western Samoa, Com-
oros, Cameroon and Fiji) noted that these were always triggered by a 
drop in the volume of exports to the Community. Sometimes, as in the 
case of iron ore or timber, a fall in export prices was involved, but it was 
almost never the sole or decisive cause of the intervention. 
A third of all transfers were used wholly to cover expenditure unrelated 
to the commodity concerned (inter alia for debt servicing, supplemen-
tary or local currency financing of infrastructure projects and coverage 
of day-today administrative costs). Where transfers were partly used in 
the export sector concerned, the money was spread fairly evenly between 
projects, price support and income support measures for farmers. 
The Commission report stressed that as Stabex money was used large-
ly outside the sector for which the application was made, it  had com-
paratively little sectoral stabilising effect. It did, however, have some im-
pact on government revenue (although this varied widely), helped some 
countries to tackle their more urgent balance of payment problems, and 
provided other countries with the money needed to complete projects 
without having to hunt for financing. 
The study concluded that «ACP governments do not feel any obligation 
to use transfers to help producers in the sectors concerned. As there are 
no firm rules for use of transfers, nor any obligation to spend Stabex money 
on the sector concerned, the recipient government assesses the prospects 
for that sector when the transfer comes through, sets them against other 
export or sectoral priorities and allocates the Stabex funds accordingly». 
EC  deliberations on future of Stabex 
Both the EC and the ACP have made it clear that although they still see 
Stabex as being an essential element of the Lome Convention, the system 
needs to be improved before it can be carried over into their new coopera-
tion agreement. 
(1)  «Financial  and technical cooperation under the  Lome Convention  in  1981» COM  (82)  707. 
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TABLE  II 
AFRICA'S SHARE IN WORLD PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
OF TROPICAL PRODUCTS 1970-1980 
PRODUCTION  EXPORTS 
'000 tonnes  Variation  % of world output  '000 tonnes  Variation  o/o  of world exports 
~98011970  ~980/1970 
1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980 
Bananas  3.771  4.401  + 16.7  12,19  11,21  394  272  -31.0  6.79  3.93 
Green  coffee  1.281  1.151  -10.1  30.03  23.87  1.011  900  -11.0  30.83  24.07 
Cocoa (beans)  1.097  927  -15.5  72.99  59.54  866  727  -16.1  76.43  70.17 
Tea  117  185  + 58.1  9.01  9.81  109  162  + 48.6  14.61  17.11 
Groundnuts  5.664  4.801  -15.2  30.87  25.40  766  166  -78.3  77.14  22.34 
Groundnut oil  - - - - - 290  157  -45.9  67.60  31.84 
Copra  150  167  + 11.3  3.90  3.67  74  15  -79.7  8.05  1.24 
Palm  oil  1.109  1.365  + 23.1  55.92  26.87  178  129  -27.5  19.65  3.65 
Palm kern.oil  - - - - - 58  106  + 82.8  35.15  28.12 
Cotton  fibre  1.318  1.213  - 8.0  10.96  8.43  968  622  -35.7  24.56  12.77 
. 
Nat.  rubber  215  204  - 5.1  7.16  5.35  206  143  -30.6  7.21  4.28 
Source : «Marches tropicaux et mediterraneenS>>. 
I Development Cori"tmissk>ner Edgard Pisani has stressed that the em-
phasis w. the' forthcoming negotiations for a new EC/ACP cooperation 
agreement wi.JI  be on making Stabex more credible, both from the finan-
cial and economic points of view. 
When negotiators from both sides begtn examining the future of Stabex, 
discussions will  have to take account of the following aspects : 
should Stabex be an  instrument of development policy rather 
than an additional source of deficit funding. As originally intend-
ed, it should as much as possible be self-financing; 
fluctuations in world commodity prices are unlikely to cease in 
the immediate future. This means that Stabex will still be need-
ed by the ACP states whose export earnings from commodities 
will continue to vacillate in  the years ahead; 
as there are no signs that new commodity agreements will be 
concluded in the near future- or that existing ones will function 
more effectively - Stabex will  continue to perform  its export 
stabilisation  functions  without  help  from  price  stabilisation 
mechanisms included in  commodity agreements; 
the demand on Stabex financial resources could increase con-
siderably in the future, especially as African agriculture produc-
tion and exports are declining in comparison to Asian and Latin 
American output. Africa's share of world production and exports 
of tropical products is detailed in Table II. 
in order to be able to deal more effectively with structural pro-
blems facing African commodity-producing nations, the utilisa-
tion of Stabex funds will probably have to be linked to the pro-
ducts for which the transfers are made. 
Africa's uncharted mineral wealth 
World mineral reserves are concentrated in the large continental land 
masses of North and South America, the Soviet Union, Australia and 
Africa. Africa's riches are the least charted and the least developed.(1) 
However, where mining activity has developed in Africa, the sector has 
rapidly become a major source of export earnings. Zambia and Guinea, 
for example, depend on exports of minerals for almost 90°/o of their foreign 
exchange earnings. The dependence on mineral exports is almost 70% 
for Liberia and Mauritania and 50% for Togo and Zaire. 
Most African nations export the bulk of their copper, cobalt, phosphates, 
aluminium and manganese to the European Community, which, apart 
(1)  The developing world's share of global mineral reserves is given in Tables 4-C and 4-D  at the 
end of this chapter. 
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from a few exceptions, is poorly endowed with mineral resources. Globally 
speaking, the European Community depends for up to 750/o  on its im-
ports of minerals, compared to 90% for Japan and only 150/o for the United 
States. The EC gets its minerals from South Africa, the Soviet Union, 
North America and Africa. Countries in Asia and Latin America are also 
major sources. 
Although Africa is known to have vast mineral reserves, insufficient money 
and effort have been invested in mineral exploration and extraction on 
the continent. The fiscal policies of most governments, the risk of sum-
mary nationalisation and in some cases political instability, have com-
bined to create a climate which is not conducive to attracting foreign in-
vestment. Lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, railways and port 
facilities for transport of minerals has also discouraged potential investors. 
The latter have continued to put money in what they generally consider 
to be lower-risk regions. Investments have focussed on the development 
of mineral  resources in  Australia,  Canada and  South Africa and in  a 
number of Latin American countries, including Brazil. 
EC/  ACP mineral cooperation 
The potential for cooperation between mineral-rich Africa and a mineral-
starved EC was recognised by the Lome Convention. Iron ore was in-
cluded on the list of commodities covered by Stabex. This was largely 
as a political gesture to provide something for Mauritania, one of the poorer 
African countries, largely dependent on iron ore. 
European leaders began to worry about the EC's rather vulnerable posi-
tion vis-a-vis its external mineral suppliers in the late 1970s when it became 
clear that European investors were ignoring Africa in favour of projects 
in Latin America and the industrialised regions. EC experts warned that 
if this trend continued, the Community would become totally dependent 
on mineral supplies from cpuntries with which it did not have the kind 
of «preferential» links that it did with the African members of the Lome 
Convention. This, they said, was especially dangerous because unlike 
the United States and Japan, the European Community has not concluded 
long-term supply agreements with its major suppliers. In addition mineral 
producers among the ACP countries had been lobbying for some time 
for a support system for minerals along the lines of Stabex. 
Discussions for the conclusion of the second Lome Convention highlighted 
three major problems facing the mining sector in  Africa : 
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lack of investments; 
absence of new loans; 
deterioration  of  the  productive  sector  because  of  lack  of 
maintenance and renewal of equipment. The need for government backing and encouragement for private in-
vestors was recognised by the new Convention which provided for four 
specific types of action in  the mining sector : 
SYSMIN : according to the Convention? this system would work 
to assist ACP mineral-producing states in thir efforts to remedy 
the harmful effects on their income of serious and unforeseen 
temporary disruptions affecting those mining sectors. A total of 
280 million Ecu was earmarked for EC assistance under this 
scheme for the 1981-1985 period covered by the second Lome 
Convention. Sysmin transfers are decided by the EC Commis-
sion on a yearly basis in the form of special low interest loans; 
the  Convention  also  stresses  that  the  Community  shall  be 
prepared to give its technical and financial assistance to help 
with  the  exploitation  of the  ACP  states'  mining  and  energy 
potential, 
it provides for loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
which are over and above its normal ceiling for mining invest-
ment projects (and energy projects) which are recognised as be-
ing of mutual interest, 
it allows for the conclusion of «specific»investment agreements 
to encourage European investments in the ACP mining sector. 
The only parts of the Convention dealing with minerals which have been 
implemented are the Sysmin mechanism and provisions for EIB loans : 
Sysmin aid for Zambia 
In  a decision taken in  April 1982, the European Community agreed to 
give 55 million Ecu in aid under Sysmin for Zambia's copper and cobalt 
mining sector. Zambia's production of copper and cobalt has suffered 
in recent years because of the prolonged slump in world copper prices 
political unrest in neighbouring Shaba (Zaire), Angola and Zimbabwe, and 
an increase in  production costs. 
The total cost of the Zambian project is put at 85,346,000 Ecu, of which 
55 million will come from the EC and the remaining amount from the min-
ing companies themselves. The EC loan has been granted for a 40-year 
period with an interest rate of 1%, and a ten-year grace period. 
The project aims at stabilising Zambia's production costs and capacities 
for copper and cobalt through the following measures : 
replacement of antiquated installations and equipment; 
introduction of new and improved refining methods; 
development of long-term mining methods; 
respect for security standards. 
53 To achieve this, the Government will need financing for the purchase of 
mining equipment, work supply contracts and  supplies of mining  in-
frastructure, drilling material, technical assistance for training and the 
creation of a fund for the improvement of social conditions. 
Demands for assistance by the Zambian government were triggered off 
by the sudden decline in the country's exports of copper and cobalt. The 
project is expected to be completed by 1985. 
Sysmin aid to Zaire 
Zaire received 40 million Ecu in Sysmin assistance from the EC in July 
1982 for maintaining copper and cobalt production capacities. Produc-
tion of both commodities had fallen because of the prolonged slump in 
world prices but also because of the government's decision to tax all min-
ing operations. The EC made its Sysmin assistance to Zaire conditional 
on certain changes in the country's taxation policies, stressing that unless 
these modifications were made, Sysmin money alone would not be able 
to redress the declining copper and cobalt production. 
The EC aid is part of a 47.5 million Ecu project with the national Gecamines 
mining company putting in the additional 7.5 million Ecu. The aim is to 
maintain production capacities. The emphasis is on : 
maintaining production; 
maintaining financial cover for operating costs; 
improving productivity; 
reducing production costs. 
This is to be achieved through the purchase of extraction material, the 
renewal of a part of internal transport infrastructure and the improvement 
of living conditions for workers. The EC loan has been granted for a 40 
year period with an interest rate of 1  °/o  and a ten-year grace period. 
Two further applications were made in  1982 for Sysmin financing, one 
by Rwanda for tin and the other by Guyana for bauxite. 
European Investment Bank operations 
The European Investment Bank financed two projects involving a total 
of 77 million Ecu in 1981 in the mining and extractive industries, making 
the sector the main recipient of the Bank's contributions. 
The first project - financed by a non-subsidised loan of 40 million Ecu 
-was designed to start up a mine working a goldbearing copper deposit 
near the Ok Tedi river in  Papua New Guinea, a further 12 million Ecu 
in the form of risk capital was also allocated to this project to help the 
state finance part of its holding in  the mining company's capital. 
54 In  addition, a loan of 25 million ECU was granted for the treatment of 
waste from the copper mines at Chingola in Zambia with a view of recover-
ing the metal still contained in it. 
The future : developing a ccmineral  strategy~> 
European help for mineral production in the ACP countries is expected 
to be an essential part of the new EC/ACP Convention concluded after 
Lome II. 
The European Commission has begun to study the possibility of moving 
beyond the instruments such as Sysmin included in the current Conven-
tion. The emphasis will be on widening the range of operations in the 
mineral sector. Instead of tackling just the results of poor investments 
and lack of prospection, EC experts believe that more direct action aim-
ed at encouraging European investors to go to Africa should be envisag-
ed in the new Convention. Such efforts would form part of a more global 
«mineral strategy» which would build a «bridge» between : 
the EC's dependence on imports of key raw materials for its in-
dustries and 
Africa's vast mineral wealth which, however, needs a massive 
injection of funds before it can become a regular and dependable 
source of supply to the EC. 
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TABLE 4-A 
STABEX: RESULTS OF THE 1980 OPERATIONS 
Recipient ACP State  Product  Amount of transfer 
in ECU 
Burundi  Coffee  11.023,569 
Cape Verde  Bananas  214,764 
Central African Rep.  Coffee  968,396 
Chad  Cotton  2.539,816 
Comoros  Copra  246,447 
Comoros  Essential oils  852,402 
Ivory Coast  Coffee  19.195,390 
Dominica  Bananas  2.527,944 
Fiji  Coconut oil  842,296 
The Gambia  Groundnuts  3.791,992 
''  Groundnuts oil  3.191,205 
"  Oil-cake  1.134,175 
Guinea Bissau  Ground  nuts  1.259,747 
"  Palmnuts &  kernels  273,919 
Jamaica  Bananas  3.238,995 
Kenya  Coffee  10.032,204 
Kiribati  Copra  497,742 
Lesotho  Mohair  242,279 
Madagascar  Vanilla  1.211,208 
.Malawi  Tea  1.330,661 
Mali  Groundnut products  2.551,615 
Rwanda  Coffee  6.555,031 
St Lucia  Bananas  1.349,538 
Western Samoa  Cocoa  1.222,900 
Senegal  Groundnut products  30.353,160 
"  Oil-cake  8.253,832 
Sierra Leone  Palmnuts &  kernels  947,224 
Somalia  Bananas  1.423,385 
"  Raw hides & skins  415,854 
Sudan  Groundnuts  13.415,560 
Tanzania  Coffee  6.254,257 
Tonga  Copra products  602,239 
Tuvalu  Copra  14,495 
137.965.905 
Source : Commission of the European Communities. 
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STABEX TRANSFERS FOR 1981 
Recipient  ACP  State  Product  Amount of transfer 
(Ecu) 
Benin  Cotton,  not carded  or combed  130,169 
"  Palm  oil  254,585 
"  Palm  kernel  oil  544,668 
Cameroon  Cocoa  Products  10.348,448 
"  Raw  or roasted  coffee  6.988,461 
Central African  Republic  Raw or roasted  coffee  1.536,796 
Dominica  Cocoa products  502,143 
Ethiopia  Raw  or roasted  coffee  968,702 
Fiji  Coconut oil  653,391 
Gambia  Groundnuts  2.225,089 
"  Groundnut oil  1.440,360 
"  Oil cake  529,741 
Ghana  Cocoa products  32.776,692 
Grenada  Nutmeg  and  mace  197,531 
Ivory Coast  Raw  or roasted  coffee  35.329,724 
Kenya  Raw  or  roasted  coffee  21.054,231 
Lesotho  Mohair  354,533 
Madagascar  Raw  or roasted  coffee  3.440,826 
Malawi  Tea  653,391 
Mali  Sheanut  kernels  653,391 
Papua  New Guinea  Raw or roasted  coffee  9.421,513 
"  Cocoa  beans  5.738,012 
"  Copra  1.385,695 
"  Coconut oil  1.160,130 
Rwanda  Raw  or  roasted  coffee  653,391 
Samoa  Cocoa  beans  1.170,846 
"  Copra  1.035,401 
Sao Tome  and  Principe  Cocoa  beans  994,895 
Senegal  Groundnut products  26.272,999 
Sierra  Leone  Palm  kernel  products  1.082,263 
"  Cocoa  beans  53,351 
Solomon  Islands  Copra  723,321 
Somalia  Fresh  bananas  949,211 
Sudan  Cotton,  not carded  or combed  10.879,030 
Tanzania  Raw  or roasted  coffee  694,174 
Tuvalu  Copra  56,606 
TOTAL  182.853,710 
Source : Commission of the European Communities. 
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THIRD WORLD MINERAL RESERVES 
'000 tonnes 
Third World  Latin America  Asia  Africa 
18 050 000  6 190 000  2  105 000  9 755 000 
288 600  198 800  18 100  71  600 
23 000  13 800  1 800  7 400 
7 200  1 595  5 040  545 
33 400  18 100  10 800  4 500 
29 000 000  18 800 000  8 000 000  2 200 000 
161  000  44 000  30 000  87 000 
2 300  50  1 430  620 
597 000  6 000  17 000  574 000 
2 955  2 810  145  -
9 300  8  165  - 1 135 
57  3  8  45 
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316  226  90  -
235  109  110  16 
23  8  - 12 
855  645  210  -
162 700  92 200  66 300  4 200 
6 383  928  1 818  464 
102 000  35 360  10 064  13 600 
19 565 000  80 000  305 000  19 180 000 
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THIRD WORLD MINERAL RESERVES 
Percentages 
Third World  Latin America  Asia 
67.9  23.3  7.9 
58.0  40.0  3.6 
18.0  10.8  1.4 
71.4  15.8  50.0 
20.2  11.0  6.5 
30.9  20.2  8.5 
9.6  2.6  1.8 
62.7  1.3  22.4 
34.3  0.3  1.0 
37.6  35.8  1.8 
87.2  76.6  -
87.4  4.9  12.6 
56.4  8.7  45.5 
3.2  2.3  0.9 
10.7  5.0  5.0 
13.3  4.8  -
19.9  15.0  4.9 
41.1  23.2  16.8 
16.5  2.4  4.7 
37.5  13.0  3.7 
71.5  0.3  1.1 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINANCIAL  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE 
COMMUNITY 
AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Third World finance : on the brink of collapse 
Nowhere has the development crisis of the past few years been more 
manifest than in the problem of Third World finance. Yet it is not just the 
notorious debt traumas of a minority of developing countries, rich enough 
to borrow large amounts of capital from private banks, which has brought 
North-South financial relations to a watershed. It is also the less spec-
tacular but no less real balance-of-payments crisis of many lower-income 
developing countries, whose staggering external and fiscal deficits left 
no choice but to cut back on imports vital to basic production activities, 
which acutely threatens the very basis of their development. 
Since the first oil price shock in 1973, the combined current account deficit 
of non-oil developing countries increased ninefold, crossing the 100 billion 
dollar mark in 1981. By that time, all the principal sources of finance ex-
port earnings, commercial bank loans and official development assistance 
- had stopped growing or had even declined in real terms. To cope with 
the resulting constraints, this group of countries had to choke off 4% of 
their imports, while their overall average rate of real growth was roughly 
halved from 1979 to 1981, dropping to 2.5%. 
Behind these aggregate figures, however, lie the vastly different develop-
ment paths and prospects of some 100 low and middle-income countries, 
increasingly distinguished from each other by their domestic policies, in-
come levels, economic growth rates as well as their level of dependence 
on  imports and exports.  Only for a  few newly industrialising or large 
developing countries will development continue to depend primarily on 
domestic choices between consumption and productive investment. Many 
others, particularly in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where growth 
in production barely keeps pace with population growth, have little !at-
titude to redirect scarce resources from basic needs to investment. 
After falling in 1981, official development aid (ODA) from the industrialis-
ed countries of the OECD recovered again in 1982 to its record level of 
1980. Although aid granted by the Member States of the Community eased 
in 1982 from the previous year's level in dollar terms, the share of GNP 
devoted to ODA was maintained at the previous year's level of 0.53%. 
Overall OECD aid reached 27.92bn dollars in  1982 against 25.64bn in 
1981  and 27.26bn in 1980. The stagnation of member states aid in 1982 
reflects partly the impact of the recession on  EC economies but more 
particularly the appreciation of the dollar against European currencies. 
The principal reason for the rise in OECD aid in 1982 was the recovery 
in  American ODA which had contracted sharply in  1981. 
Despite the difficulties in expanding overall aid levels experienced in 1982, 
the Community members remain committed to a national aid target of 
0.7% of GNP. This level has already been exceeded by Denmark and 
the Netherlands. Italy, whose level of ODA is the lowest among the EC 
countries, has shown the biggest proportional rise in its contributions in 
recent years. The Commission took the initiative in  1982 to press for a 
63 Community (as distinct from national) aid target of 0.1 o;o of GNP by 1990, 
double the current level of 0.05%.(1) 
While some 50 countries should be able to reduce their dependence on 
official aid during the 1980s, the World Bank estimates that another 40 
low-income countries will  rely almost entirely on  ODA to  supplement 
domestic resources for their physical and human development. Common 
to all factors contributing to the Third World liquidity crisis is the increas-
ing differentiation among developing countries, with the LLDCs, which 
achieved the lowest growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s, actually falling 
back in  real terms in  the 1980s. For the Community this accenty,ated 
disparity  dictates the  challenge  and  the  geographic  priorities  for  its 
development assistance in the present decade. 
Europe's aid to the Third World 
The Community and its member states in 1982 provided 44% of the of-
ficial development assistance disbursed by the OECD countries, or 33% 
of the world's total aid flows (Table 1). 
TABLE I 
Amounts in  US  $ billion 
1980  1981  1982 
World  Development aid  36.36  35.51  36.30 
OECD  countries (DAC)  (1)  27.26  25.64  27.92 
EC  Member States (2)  13.05  13.34  12.15 
Community aid  1.29  1.60  2.10 
(1)  DAC  =  Development Assistance Committee; does not include Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Greece. 
(2)  Excluding Ireland,  Luxembourg and  Greece. 
Source : OECD, Resources for Developing Countries and recent trends 
(June 1983). 
(1)  Memorandum on  the Community's Development Policy,  op.  cit. 
64 TABLE II 
BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNITY FINANCING BY 
TYPE OF CONTRIBUTION 
a)  European Development Fund (EDF) 
Commitments under the third, fourth and fifth EDFs are shown below 
(in  millions of Ecu) 
1981  1982 
Projects, technical cooperation, training  383.3  600 
Regional funds  49.2  120 
Stabex  143.1  112.2 
Sysmin  - 95 
Trade promotion  6.5  17 
Exceptional aid  24.6  50 
Budget of Technical Centre for Agricul-
ture and Rural Cooperation  - 0.5 
Budget of Centre for Industrial Develop.  4.3  4.5 
EIB drawings on the EDF  91  70 
TOTAL  702  1 069.1 
b)  Budget 
Commitments from Community budget appropriations are shown in the 
Table below 
(in  millions of Ecu) 
1981  1982 
Food aid  498.1  499.6 
Cooperation with non-associated 
developing countries  161.6  210.2 
Specific measures  16.1  21.9 
Exceptional measures  23  31.5 
Cooperation with Mediterranean countries  156.3  209.5 
Commodities cooperation  - -
TOTAL  855.1  972.7 
65 ~  TABLE Ill 
MEMBER STATES' DEVELOPMENT AID CONTRIBUTIONS 
Amount in US $  million 
Net disbursement  1980  1981 
Total  in  o/o  Total  in  o/o  Total 
ODA  GNP  ODA  GNP  ODA 
Belgium  594.9  0.50  574.6  0.59  497 
Denmark  480.6  0.74  403.3  0.73  415 
France (including DOM TOM)  4,161.7  0.64  4,177.0  0.73  3,991 
Germany  3,566.5  0.44  3,181.2  0.47  3,163 
Ireland  31.0  0.19  29.0  0.17  (a) 
Italy  683.3  0.17  665.5  0.19  820 
Luxembourg  8.0  0.19  10.8  0.30  (a) 
Netherlands  1,630.4  1.03  i ,510.0  1.08  1,473 
United Kingdom  1,852.0  0.35  2,194.9  0.44  1,794 
Greece  (a)  (a)  14.74  (a)  (a) 
---- ------ ---- -- - -
---- ----
(a)  not available 















i Even though the Ten have not yet collectively attained the aid target of 
0.7% of GNP, the growth of their ODA has been remarkable, particularly 
in the light of the serious economic and budgetary problems virtually all 
of them have had to face. During the past decade, development aid of 
the member states expanded by a real 50/o  annually to reach 0.53% of 
GNP in 1982. Resources mobilized by the Community as such increas-
ed even more rapidly during that period. Its ODA appropriations rose an-
nually by 7 %  in real terms, amounting to 1.6 bn Ecu in 1981  and 2.1 
bn  Ecu in  1982 (Table II). 
The  Member  States  Development  Programmes  and 
Policies 
The Community's development assistance programme, to which the EC 
countries contribute on average some 10% of their aid budgets, seeks 
to complement rather than duplicate their efforts. Several common trends 
in the development policies of the member states and the Community 
have nevertheless become salient in recent years. The most important 
ones are: 
a greater concentration of aid efforts on low-income countries 
(LICs) and the poorest or least-developed countries (LLDCs); 
a gradual decrease in aid tied to specific, individual projects and 
a parallel increase in non-project assistance supporting certain 
sectors of an economy, specific geographic regions or local in-
stitutions over a longer period; 
a  stronger  emphasis  placed  on  basic  infrastructure  and 
agricultural projects. 
The following  description of the member states development policies 
merely attempts to highlight their most prominent features. An overview 
of the Ten's aid performance (1)  is given in  Table Ill. 
BELGIUM (2) : In line with the overall curtailment of public expenditures, 
imposed by a budget deficit of 160/o of GNP, aid appropriations declined 
noticeably in 1980, but in 1981  picked up again by a strong 23% in na-
tional currency terms, followed by a further nominal increase of 15°/o in 
1982. Excluding contributions to the EC (1 0°/o),  some 26% of Belgian 
ODA in 1980 went to multilateral institutions, in particular to FAO, UNDP 
and the World Bank (IDA). The sixth replenishment of IDA in  1981  ac-
counted for one-quarter of rrroltilateral assistance or 52 million dollars. 
(1)  Excluding financial assistance other than  ODA. 
(2)  The country-by-country data given in  trns section comes from the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee. 
67 Some two-thirds of Belgian aid is granted in bilateral form, with a strong 
emphasis on the three former colonies Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. In 
the last ten years, however, the geographical breakdown has gradually 
diversified. The three main beneficiaries in 1980-1982 accounted for about 
half of bilateral ODA, compared with 770/o  in  1972. (Low-income coun-
tries received more than 700/o  of total ODA in 1982, with 27% going to 
the least developed countries. 
Between 1979 and 1981, integrated pilot programmes of five year dura-
tion were launched in 12 target countries. Belgian authorities plan to in-
troduce such global financing measures for certain priority sectors in all 
developing countries receiving bilateral assistance. While special em-
phasis continues to be given to technical assistance (over soo;o in 1981 ), 
there has been a gradual shift towards other forms of support such as 
the above mentioned integrated programme aid and co-financing pro-
jects. The grant element of bilateral aid surpasses 75°/o,  while credits 
are usually extended at very favourable terms. About half of the bilateral 
financial aid  is tied to procurements in  Belgium. 
DENMARK : Exceeding the 0.  70/o  of GNP aid target since 1978, Den-
mark belongs to the international» front runners»in ODA volume despite 
its fragile economic situation. Guided by the principle of «non-political» 
aid, Danish aid is almost equally divided between multilateral (46%) and 
bilateral assistance (54%). In its appropriations to international organisa-
tions, Denmark shows a clear preference for UN agencies, particularly 
UNDP and FAO.  In  1981, the distribution was 47% for the United Na-
tions, 27% for the World Bank group plus 8% for regional development 
banks. The EC development programmes received 17%. 
Bilateral assistance is also divided almost equally between grants and 
highly concessional loans. Generally, loans are tied to procurements in 
Denmark, while grants are not. African and Asian low-income countries 
receive the bulk of Danish bilateral ODA, with 34% earmarked for the 
LLDCs in  1982. To enhance its effectiveness, development assistance 
is  highly concentrated : Tanzania,  Bangladesh,  India,  Kenya and the 
Sudan together have received nearly half of the bilateral aid in  recent 
years. Like the other Nordic countries, Denmark emphasises the role of 
women in the development process as well as environmental problems 
and demographic questions (birth control projects in  Bangladesh and 
India). 
FRANCE :After the 1981 elections, the socialist government introduced 
several changes in development policy, including the intention to increase 
the share of ODA going to developing countries other than the Overseas 
Deparments and Territories (DOM-TOM) and to adapt official assistance 
more to the needs of these recipients. The aim was to reduce the LDCs 
dependence on the external economic environment, i.e., the satisfaction 
of internal demand (particularly as concerns basic needs) rather than ex-
port promotion. Those policy changes were accompanied by a steep 
nominal ODA increase of 33% in  1981, bringing the overall ODA/GNP 
68 ratio to 0.73%. This increased by a further 16% in national currency terms 
in  1982 to 0.74% of GNP, the highest level since 1965. Excluding aid 
to its own overseas departments and territories, French ODA totalled 2.6bn 
dollars in 1982, or 0.48% of GNP against 0.46% in 1981  and 0.36% in 
1980. France is committed to reaching the 0.7% target by 1988. Aid to 
Africa is concentrated on the former colonies (92%) and other francophone 
countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Mauritius : 6%). The grant element 
of French ODA has gradually declined from 94.1% in 1976 to 85.5% in 
1980. French aid has remained highly tied, the proportion varying bet-
ween 80 and 90%. 
WEST GERMANY : Taking account of the Brandt Commission report, 
the  1980  guidelines  on  development  cooperation  emphasized  rural 
development, energy cooperation and the protection of natural resources 
as priority sectors. In more general terms, German development policy 
stresses the integration of LDCs into the world economy as well as the 
safeguarding of their political independence and their cultural identities. 
An important role is given to direct investments, which are supported by 
a comprehensive system of risk insurance and fiscal benefits, and other 
private flows. Consequently, ODA is considered a supplement to these 
transfers and in particular to the developing countries' own efforts. 
Although Germany has not accepted a specific time limit for the aid target 
of 0.7o/o  of GNP, the volume of overall aid doubled between 1977 and 
1979, reaching 0.47% of GNP in 1981 and 0.48% in 1982. Excluding con-
tributions to the EC, Germany channeled 270/o of its ODA to multilateral 
agencies, giving particular preference to international financial institu-
tions (World Bank group 540/o, Asian Development Bank 12%). For a long 
time, German aid was divided among a large number of LDCs. This policy, 
however, is in the process of being reversed, with a growing proportion 
of ODA now going to the African and Asian «poverty belts». Low-income 
countries now account for half of the bilateral ODA, including 22.3% for 
the LLDCs. Grants amounted to 86% of German aid in 1981, while 74% 
of ODA disbursements were provided in untied form, as against 82% in 
1980. The sectoral breakdown of German ODA has remained relatively 
constant over the past several years, with 35% slated for public services 
(electricity,  communications,  transport,  etc.)  followed  by  industry, 
agriculture and education, each with between 15°/o  and 20%. 
GREECE : Itself considered a developing country by the OECD, Greece 
represents a particular case among the member states. This does not 
prevent it from allocating resources to Third World countries. A member 
of all principal international development agencies, Greece contributes 
a share of its aid in convertible currencies which sets it apart from most 
LDC donors. It participated in the sixth replenishment of IDA with 6 million 
dollars and in 1980/1981 provided 615.000 dollars for UNDP and 120.000 
dollars for UNICEF. Since 1981, Greece participates in the Communi-
ty's aid efforts via its general budget appropriations, of which 8 million 
dollars were earmarked for LDCs. Greece will also contribute funds to 
69 the EDF,  but the amounts still  have to be  decided by the Council of 
Ministers. 
IRELAND :Since 1975, Ireland substantially increased its ODA from 6.7 
million dollars to 31  million in 1980, of which over two-thirds was allocated 
to multilateral institutions (including the EC with 450/o).  Bilateral aid was 
provided exclusively in form of grants for technical assistance combined 
with capital aid, as well as volunteer programmes. One-quarter of bilateral 
ODA was earmarked for co-financing projects with non-governmental 
organisations mainly in the field of education. Ireland concentrates over 
half of the bilateral ODA on four priority countries :Lesotho, Sudan, Tan-
zania and Zambia. 
ITALY : Since 1977, Italy has been engaged in a major overhaul of its 
development policy, characterized by a steep increase in its ODA volume, 
the creation of a substantial bilateral aid programme and a strong con-
centration on agricultural projects and food aid. Italy's ODA/GNP ratio 
trebled from 0.080/o  in  1979 to 0.24% in 1982 and is due to reach the 
DAC average of 0.350/o by 1984. Before 1979, over 900/o  of Italy's ODA 
was in form of multilateral aid. Apart from the EC which received one-
third, FAO followed by regional development banks and UNDP were the 
major recipients. Conforming to the new government directives, the share 
of bilateral aid rose from 150/o  in 1980 to 280/o  1981  and will constitute 
about half of Italy's ODA by 1983-1984. Grants, which more than doubl-
ed in national currency between 1980 and 1981, account for over 97% 
of the total bilateral ODA. Among the member states of the Community 
and DAC, Italy has one of the best records for untied aid, with only some 
200/o  of its grants being tied to purchases in the donor country. 
Africa received 600/o of the bilateral ODA in 1981, Mediterranean coun-
tries 23% and Latin America 80/o, while the least developed countries in 
these regions got half of the total amount. 
LUXEMBOURG : From 1978 to 1980, Luxembourg allocated 0.200/o  of 
its GDP to development aid, which in  1981  rose to 10.8 million dollars 
or 0.30% of GDP.  In  that year, 54% of the total ODA was in  form of 
multilateral aid, with threequarters going to the EC and the World Bank 
group. Grants account for 400/o  of bilateral aid, which is largely directed 
to social infrastructure projects (hospitals, schools) in Algeria, Togo and 
Rwanda. Concessional credits make up another 400/o  of bilateral ODA 
and food aid accounts for most of the remainder. 
NETHERLANDS : Dutch development policy is guided by two major prin-
ciples : the improvement of the LDCs'  structural position in the world 
economy through measures assisting self-sustained economic growth and 
direct efforts to combat absolute poverty in the developing countries. Net 
ODA in 1982 increased by 4% in national currency terms and as a percen-
tage of GNP maintained the record 1981  level of 1.080/o. This has been 
the best performance recorded by any DAC country since the early 1960s. 
The share of multilateral ODA varies between 25-30%. Excluding the EC 
70 (8%), the principal recipients are UNDP (260/o), World Food Programme 
(11 %) and FAO (6.50/o). For reasons of effectiveness, bilateral aid is con-
centrated on a limited number of LDCs chosen among the low-income 
group according to  certain criteria regarding human rights and fiscal 
management. The list of the so-called «target countries», which usually 
receive about half of the bilateral aid (52°/o in 1980), is frequently modified 
and in 1980-1981 included 13 countries. The principal beneficiaires were 
India (12%), the Netherlands Antilles, Indonesia and Tanzania (each 7%) 
as well as Surinam (6%) and the Sahel countries (50/o).  Overall, the low-
income countries obtained 55% of the bilateral ODA, including 22% for 
the LLDCs. 
The grant element of bilateral ODA is now about 90%, threequarters of 
which is in  form of untied aid. Dutch aid increasingly takes the form of 
«programme aid•• aimed at the long-term support (1  10 years) of sectoral-
ly or geographically integrated projects. Some 400/o of the ODA destined 
for  the  13 target countries  already falls  in  the  non-project category. 
Agriculture and public services (water and electricity supplies) are the 
two priority sectors of Dutch assistance, followed by education and social 
infrastructure. In the future, it is planned to concentrate ODA progressively 
on food production and energy. 
UNITED KINGDOM : At irregular intervals, so-called «White papers•• define 
the guidelines of British development policy.  The  latest white paper, 
published in 1981, like its predecessors, stressed the importance of aid 
for the least-developed countries. It also recommended a  reduction in 
multilateral ODA in favour of bilateral assistance and put greater emphasis 
on non-concessionai financial flows and direct investments. After a very 
sharp rise in 1981 to 0.44% of GNP, British ODA fell by 120/o in real terms 
in  1982, bringing the ODA/GNP ratio down to 0.38%. The figures were 
affected in  part by the timing of aid to India. The 1983 figures are ex-
pected to show a rise again. In accordance with the white paper recom-
mendations, the share of multilateral ODA decreased from 44% in 1979 
to 39% in 1981. Contributions to the EC, however, have increased from 
6% to 16%. The lion's share of British multilateral aid goes to the World 
Bank group (68%) and United Nations agencies (20%). Although bilateral 
aid is given to some 130 countries, the major part goes to ten priority 
beneficiaries in Asia and Africa. The grant element in British ODA to more 
than 90% and includes all financial aid going to LICs and LLDCs. Over 
half of the bilateral ODA has been tied to procurements of British goods 
and services.  Public services (390/o),  education (22%) and agriculture 
(16%) are the three principal sectors of bilateral assistance. 
The spread of Community aid 
In general terms, the Community's aid programmes fall into two broad 
categories : 
contractual aid which covers primarily the members of the Lome 
71 Convention  and the Mediterranean states (the  Maghreb and 
Mashreq countries and Israel) with bilateral agreements with the 
Community; 
international operations applied by the Community autonomously 
in  the form  of technical and financial  assistance to the non-
associated countries, food and emergency aid, as well as finan-
cial assistance to non-governmental organisations and aid pro-
vided under cooperation agreements which are not financed on 
a contractual basis. 
The Lome Convention (and the earlier Yaounde Conventions) are at the 
heart of the Community's financial aid policies. From the first European 
Development Fund (EDF) of 1959 and Yaounde I (1964-1970), which made 
some 730 million Ecu available to 19 newly-independent African coun-
tries, the policy has expanded to cover over 60 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific-states with-a budget of 4,5 billion Ecu.(1) 
Alongside Lome, the Community established a wide spectrum of program-
mes to promote social and economic development in the Third World. 
This includes emergency and food aid, technical assistance, as well as 
money allocated for non-governmental organisations, trade promotion and 
regional cooperation. One result of this diversification of instruments has 
been a much wider geographical spread of EC aid. 
In the early years of Community development cooperation, African states 
received well over 800/o of the funds made available by the Community. 
Being among the poorest countries in the world they still get well over 
half of the Community's ODA, but a larger share is now earmarked for 
other developing countries : during the past decade, Africa on average 
received 65% of Community financial aid, leaving 35°/o to be allocated 
mainly to Asian and Latin American countries. By comparison, Africa ac-
counts for some 450/o  of the Member States' bilateral aid. 
Assistance to non-Associated LDCs 
It was in 1975 that the Commission presented the Council with an action 
programme on  financial  and technical  assistance  for  non-associated 
developing countries, which in  1981  was complemented by an outline 
regulation-setting the guidelines, aims and possibilities of this type of Com-
munity aid. 
Although programme funds reaching these countries were rapidly increas-
ed to about one-quarter of total Community aid, they are admittedly still 
far too low in per capita terms, given that some 1  ,300 million people live 
in the 30 non-associated countries which so far have benefitted from the 
(1)  Community aid in the context of the Lome Convention is examined in detail in  Chapter Six of 
this document. 
72 programme.  In  comparison,  the associated  LDCs  count  a  combined 
population of 500 million people. On the other hand, the fact that the aid 
is given in the form of grants and directed mainly to food production in 
the poorest countries (75%) has meant an effective utilisation of these 
funds. 
Generally speaking over the past years, 73% of the aid programmes has 
been earmarked for projects in Asia where India is the biggest recipient, 
200/o for Latin America and 7% for non-Lome countries in Africa. China 
has not so far concluded any aid agreements with the Community. The 
Commission feels, however, that a number of rural development projects 
currently under study by the Chinese Government are consistent with 
the  goals  set  by  the  EC  for  its  financial  and  technical  assistance 
programme. 
Community aid to the non-associates can take three forms. It can be a 
one-off operation, covering aid to one specific project, and concentrating 
on one particular aspect of rural life in the country concerned (for instance 
improving village water supplies, or setting up a clinic). Or, EC aid can 
cover a larger geographical area as is the case for integrated rural develop-
ment programmes. Finally, aid can go to national development program-
mes covering an entire country. This is the case for training program-
mes, credit or marketing facilities and the like. 
The Tables 5-A and 5-B at the end of this chapter give a financial and 
geographic overview of the non-associates programme. 
Emergency Aid 
The Community has developed rapid and effective means of stepping 
in with immediate and unbureaucratic help in emergencies, be it in form 
of natural disasters, wars or political conflicts from which people have 
to flee. A large proportion of the available funds are in fact used to aid 
refugees. These emergency funds are available to all developing coun-
tries. Assistance for the ACP countries is financed from a special EDF 
allocation of 150 million Ecu for Lome I and 200 million Ecu for Lome 
II.  Similar budget appropriations exist for the non-associated countries 
which like the aid for ACP countries are intended to cover the most urgent 
needs such as medicine, temporary shelters, and food in the event of 
disasters. All in all, the Community distributed 63 million Ecu in emergency 
aid  in  1980, 47.5 million in  1981  and 81.5 million in  1982. 
Food aid 
Over 400 million seriously undernourished people and some ten million 
refugees directly dependent on outside help for sheer survival make food 
aid the Community's most important humanitarian programme. To help 
reduce hunger in the world, the EC in 1982 again greatly increased its 
73 food aid budget, which at 700 million Ecu (500m Ecu in 1981) now amounts 
to about one-fourth of total Community ODA. 
EC food aid went to more than 60 Third World countries in  1982. It in-
cluded 1  .1  million tonnes of cereals,  150,000 tonnes of skimmed milk 
powder and 45,000 tonnes of butteroil. Only a small fraction of this is 
used for disaster relief or refugee support. The bulk goes to cover cases 
of chronic shortages in specific regions. 
Food aid can only be effective if it is integrated as part of an overall food 
strategy. Such strategies have been adopted by a number of developing 
countries. The Community declared itself ready to participate in implemen-
ting these strategies with any developing countries that asked it.(1) 
Combining financial instruments 
In the light of the financial constraints experienced by most LDCs, as well 
as the overall inadequacy of ODA, the Commission has recommended 
that the Community. step  up and  broaden the use of its financial  in-
struments to assist both Lome and non-associated countries in tapping 
the resources of international capital markets. With EIB loans being so 
far the only instrument available to the EC for channeling market resources 
to developing countries, the Commission favours a more liberal interpreta-
tion of Article 18 of the EIB's statute, so as to enable the Bank to under-
take financial operations outside the ACP-Mediterranean area to which 
they are presently limited. It is further envisaged that the Community use 
its own borrowing capacity for the benefit of developing countries in order 
to finance economicallyviable mining and energy projects. 
Cofinancing Macro and Micro-Projects 
The Community seeks to combine with other aid donors in the financing 
of large infrastructure projects designed to lay the basis for self-sustained 
development, such as dams, irrigation systems, roads, ports and railways. 
Particularly successful in this respect has been the triangular coopera-
tion between the Community, the ACP countries and the Arab States, 
which during Lome I helped to finance 48 projects worth 3.6 billion Ecu. 
The Community provided 360/o of the total, the recipient states 22% and 
Arab funds 12%, while another 12% were contributed by the World Bank 
and 14% by other donors. In  the same period, 29 co-financing opera-
tions totalling 1.6 billion Ecu were carried through in non-associated LDCs 
and six such projects worth 1.7 billion Ecu were approved for the Maghreb 
and Mashreq countries. 
(1)  See  also Chapter One of this document. 
74 The  Community's  principal  partners  in  cofinancing  under  the  non-
associates programme have been the international and regional develop-
ment agencies, led by the Asian Development Bank which contributed 
47.4 million Ecu and the World Bank (23.5 million Ecu). The Member 
States participated in  17 projects and contributed 58.8 million Ecu. 
Both geographical pattern and sectoral breakdown closely parallelled the 
make-up of the overall non-associates programme, as Asia accounted 
for 700/o of cofinanced funding, followed by Latin America with 230/o and 
Africa with 7%, while an overwhelming proportion of funds (92%) went 
into agricultural projects with a particular emphasis on irrigation. There-
maining 8% were used to finance utilities. 
At the other end of the aid spectrum, the Community established work-
ing relationships with leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
engaged at the grass-root level with the most deprived populations in the 
Third World. NGO microprojects were first cofinanced in 1976, albeit with 
a modest budget of 2.5 million Ecu. Since then, allocations have been 
gradually increased to reach 14 million Ecu in 1981 which, however, was 
only sufficient to cover about one-third of the applications for cofinanc-
ing. Nevertheless, the Community by the end of 1982 had supported 187 
NGOs  in  1,116  projects  with  81.1  million  Ecu  which  benefitted  107 
developing countries and led to a total joint investment of 212 million Ecu. 
TABLE 5-A 
AID TO NON-ASSOCIATED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
TOTAL FUNDS COMMITTED 
(in million Ecu) 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
20.0  45.0  70.0  110.0  138.5  161.6  210.2  235.0 
75 TABLE 5-B 
1982 PROGRAMME, COMMITMENTS BY RECIPIENT 
(in  million Ecu) 
India  46.000  Angola  8.750 
Bangladesh  23.600  Mozambique  10.658 
Bhutan  3.400 
Nepal  3.700  Total AFRICA  19.408 
Indonesia  11.670 
Thailand  17.220  Post-catastrophe  9.700 
ASEAN  0.030  Research  5.500 
Expertise  4.000 
Total ASIA  105.620 
Total  GENERAL 
Total GENERAL 
Costa Rica  18.000  PROVISIONS  19.200 
Dominican Rep.  12.000 
Haiti  6.600 
Honduras  16.900 
Nicaragua  9.800 
Andean Pact  0.676  GRAND TOTAL  210.204 
CIMMYT  2.000 
Total LATIN 
AMERICA  65.976 
Source : CEC. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COOPERATION  BETWEEN  THE COMMUNITY 
AND THE 
DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD 
yy  ... ·z.P-The Lome Convention in  1981/1983 
Although preparations for the new EC-ACP Convention have taken up 
much of European Commission's time, questions related to the implemen-
tation of the second Lome Convention received equal importance. The 
following pages review some of the key aspects of EC-ACP relations bet-
ween 1981  and 1983. 
Most of the EC' s assistance to the ACP states from the European Develop-
ment Fund (2.3 billion Ecu) was programmed in 1981, but implemented 
in 1982. An indicative aid programme was drawn jointly up by the Com-
mission and the ACP national governements for each of the 63 ACP states. 
The pace of the financial commitments entered into under these indicative 
programmes speeded up considerably. While commitments at the end 
of 1981  amounted to 12% of the total for the programmes drawn up at 
that date, they exceeded 30% (or 902 million Ecu) of the total at the end 
of 1982. The rate, however, varies from one ACP State to another, rang-
ing from 0.40/o in  Liberia to 91.8% in Western Samoa. 
The amount available under Lome II for regional cooperation (631.5 million 
Ecu) was entirely programmed for the financing of regional projects or 
programmes in the seven ACP regions. The European Commission com-
mitted almost 1.2 billion Ecu (including Stabex transfers (1 }, emergency 
aid and money for trade promotion) for development projects in the ACP 
states, in 1982, that is 43.5% more than in 1981. A further 159.5 million 
Ecu came from the EIB. Two-thirds of the financing decisions taken by 
the European Development Fund focussed on the «production develop-
ment sector», with rural development projects and industrialisation and 
energy projects getting equal amounts from this global chapter heading. 
In the rural development sector, alongside the financing of traditional large-
scale integrated development projects, there were also more modest pro-
jects aimed at giving the rural population the means of improving their 
living conditions. The emphasis is also on microprojects, stockfarming, 
and fishery projects. 
Commitments for industrialisation and energy projects received about the 
same amount as that committed for the rural sector. The emphasis was 
on developing industries which could use local resources and on industrial 
promotion, the development of small and medium sized enterprises and 
on training. Energy projects included the development of hydro-electric 
or geothermal power, and coal. A considerable part of Community aid 
was also directed to the development of new and renewable sources of 
energy. 
Social development in the broad sense, including education and train-
ing, but also health, water engineering, urban infrastructure and hous-
ing accounted for around 10% of financing decisions taken in  1982. 
(1)  The operation of the Stab  ex and Sysmin mechanisms is examined in Chapter IV of this document. 
79 Financial aid under Lome II 
Together with subsidised loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
the sum of 5.2 billion Ecu has been committed for the period of Lome 
II, with an additional94 million Ecu earmarked for the overseas territories 
and countries (OTC's) still linked to Member States. Tables I and II give 
a breakdown of Lome II funds and the Member States contributions (which 
fall  outside  the  Community's  general  budget).  Administrative  and 
operating costs to the tune of 180 million Ecu, which previously were in-
cluded in the EDF, are now covered by the Community under its regular 
budget, thus freeing the entire EDF for project aid. 
TABLE I 
COMMUNITY FINANCIAL AID (EDF  +  EIB) 
Community financial aid to the ACP States for the 2nd Lome Con-
vention (1981-1985) has been set at 5 227 million Ecu broken down 
as follows : 
5th EDF : 4  542 million Ecu 
of which : 2 928 million in the form of grants 
504 million in the form of special loans 
280 million in the form of risk capital 
Total project aid : 
3 712 million Ecu 
+  Stabex  550 million Ecu 
+  Sysmin  280 million Ecu 
EIB* : 685 million Ecu in the form of loans from the Bank's own 
resources with interest rate subsidies of 3% 
Grand total : 5 227 million Ecu 
*  The EIB will be able to commit 200 million Ecu to the mining and energy 
sector in the form of ordinary loans not eligible for interest rate subsi-
dies. This sum is not included here. 
Source : CEC. 
Accounting for 40°/o of programme aid, agriculture is the priority sector 
of Lome II. Then come transport and telecommunications with 20%, the 
social sector (training and public health) with 12%, industry, energy and 
mining with 9% and housing and urban development with 6%. 
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MEMBER STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIFTH EDF 
The fifth EDF stands at 4 636 million Ecu (4 542 million Ecu for finan-
cing operations in the ACP States plus 94 million Ecu earmarked 
for the overseas countries and territories (OCT), made up of Mem-
ber States' contributions in the following amounts (in million Ecus) 



















Cooperation with the Mediterranean Countries 
Nowhere is the interrelation between trade and aid more pronounced than 
in the Community's cooperation agreements with the Mediterranean coun-
tries. Modelled on the Lome Convention, the accords with the countries 
of the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco), the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria,  Lebanon)  and  Israel  represent an  integrated package of trade 
preferences, export promotion and technology transfer as well as finan-
cial  aid protocols. 
The latter are of five year duration while the overall agreements- unlike 
the Lome Conventions - last indefinetly. Table Ill gives a geographical 
breakdown of the funds provided under the First and Second Financial 
Protocols. 
Although the Commission admits that aid provided under the financial 
protocols is notoriously inadequate in the light of the enormous struc-
tural changes required of the economies of the South Mediterranean coun-
tries, the Community's involvement can nevertheless serve as a catalyst 
in encouraging other funders and in promoting co-financing projects. Thus, 
potential non-EC suppliers of funds will become more interested in in-
vesting in these countries if they can be sure of preferential access to 
the Common Market for the products they might manufacture there. 
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TABLE  Ill 
FINANCIAL AID FROM THE COMMUNITY TO THE SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1981-1986 (SECOND FINANCIAL PROTOCOLS) 
(in million Ecu) 
COUNTRY  TOTAL 
Algeria  151  (114)* 
Morocco  199 (130) 
Tunisia  139  (95) 
Egypt  276 (170) 
Jordan  63  (40) 
Lebanon  50  (50) 
Syria  97  (60) 
Israel  40  (30) 
TOTAL  1,015 (689) 
--- ---------- - L_  __ 
*  First Financial Protocols,  1977-1981. 
Source : CEC. 
EIB 
107  (70) 
90  (56) 
78  (41) 
150  (93) 
37  (18) 
34  (40) 
64  (34) 
40  (30) 
560 (382) 
--- -----
BUDGET  SPECIAL  GRANTS 
LOANS 
44  (44)  16  (19)  23  (25) 
109  (74)  42  (58)  67  (16) 
61  (54)  24  (39)  37  (15) 
126  (77)  50  (14)  76  (63) 
26  (22)  7  (4)  19  (18) 
16  (1 0)  5  (2)  11  (8) 
33  (26)  11  (7)  22  (19) 
- - -




I Commission proposals for a new Mediterranean policy for 
the enlarged Community 
The prospect of European Community enlargement to include Spain and 
Portugal- and its effects on the EC's trade links with the Southern Mediter-
ranean states - has been a subject of major concern in the Maghreb, 
Mashreq and Israel since the late 1970s. Other countries also affected 
include Turkey, Cyprus, Malta. The Commission, which has studied the 
issues in a number of reports, recognises that the southward enlarge-
ment will have a major impact on its trade in industrial and agricultural 
products with its partners in the Southern Mediterranean. But, in a ma-
jor policy document, it has also stressed its determination to «Safeguard 
the policy of openness and cooperation on which it has embarked with 
the  Mediterranean  countries  ...  in  order  to  contribute  towards  their 
economic and social development». (1) 
The paper underscores the need for a new initiative which would reassure 
the Southern Mediterranean states about the EC's intentions once Spain 
and Portugal join the Community. The Mediterranean is an area of con-
siderable importance, in relation to which the Community, for historical 
and geographical reasons, is in a unique position and has responsibilities 
it cannot shirk. 
The report points out the limits of the «overall Mediterranean approach» 
worked out by the Community in 1972. For one thing, the Community's 
far-reaching concessions on the industrial side have not had the desired 
results, essentially because of the repercussions of the world economic 
crisis both on the EC and on the Southern Mediterranean states. Secondly, 
the Community's internal Mediterranean problems made it difficult for 
the EC to review its agricultural concessions granted to the Maghreb, 
Mashreq countries and Israel in the 1970s. As a result, the countries of 
the Southern Mediterranean run a trade deficit with the Community which 
totalled 3.3 billion Ecu in 1981  and 2.2 billion in 1982. This has prompted 
a number of countries to impose severe import restrictions which have, 
in fact,  hit EC exports. 
The EC recognises that the Southern Mediterranean states could well 
find  themselves  facing  even  tougher competition  on  the  Community 
market once Spain and Portugal join. Moreover, the greater ease of ac-
cess to employment which Spanish and Portuguese workers could en-
joy in the Community framework could shut the doors to immigration from 
the other Mediterranean countries. Although the Maghreb and Mashreq 
states and Israel will also benefit by enlargement because they will be 
able to export more to Spain and Portugal- who will be committed to open-
ing up their markets in  keeping with EC obligations - the Commission 
recognises «that in  the short term, the export openings created for our 
(  1)  Commission Communication to the Council on  a Mediterranean Policy for an  Enlarged Com-
munity,  COM  (82)  353  Final. 
83 Mediterranean partners on the Portuguese and Spanish markets will be 
extremely limited». 
The products most affected by EC enlargement in the agricultural sector 
include citrus fruit, particularly oranges and small fruit, fresh tomatoes, 
potatoes (especially new potatpes) wine and olive oil which account for 
the bulk of the Community's agricultural imports from countries in the 
Mediterranean area. As far as manufactures are concerned, the main 
problem is with processed food, especially tomato concentrates, fruit juice, 
canned fish, textiles and leather footwear. The EC is by far their largest 
market. 
But the Commission insists that the Community fulfil its obligations. «The 
Community should, therefore, show itself to the Mediterranean countries 
as being a reliable partner, whose trade and aid policies can be counted 
on in the longterm». The focus should be on standing by previous under-
takings in spite of continuing recession and the risk that internal cohe-
sion will diminish after enlargement. 
The main proposals for such a  policy are as follows : 
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the Community must commit itself to a consolidation of existing 
trade concessions in the agricultural sector granted to the South 
Mediterranean states; 
the Community must endeavour to ensure that its own produc-
tion policy does not clash with the interests of the Mediterranean 
partners.  It will also have to encourage as much complemen-
tarity as possible between its own and its partners' Mediterra-
nean a;~riculture, for instance, as regards the timing of produc-
tion and  marketing; 
in order to improve their trade balances (between the EC and 
the South Mediterranean states) the agreements should as far 
as possible, encourage the South Mediterranean states to gear 
their agricultural production to home demand thereby reducing· 
their dependence on food imports rather than to increase their 
exports; 
there should be no question of going back on the dutyfree ac-
cess to EC markets for industrial exports granted by the Com-
munity to the South Mediterranean states. But, the restatement 
of this principle should be accompanied by the installation of bet-
ter functioning mutual consultation machinery so that proper con-
certed action can  be taken whenever necessary; 
the main aim of a Mediterranean policy must be for the Com-
munity to help its partners with their development, while respec-
ting their domestic and foreign policies. This will require increas-
ed EC financial aid or EC assistance in getting funds mobilised 
on the international capital market; cooperation on social and labour policies also need a boost. This 
should be through efforts to give migrant workers true equality 
in their living and working condition. 
the long-term option of a global convention between the EC and 
the South Mediterranean states should be kept open. 
Finally, the Commission report makes it clear that the Community can-
not and must not let its immediate domestic and external difficulties deter 
it from following such a policy. 
Links with the non-associated states 
In addition to its preferential ties with members of the Lome Convention 
and  countries  in  the  South  Mediterranean, the EC  has continued to 
develop wide-ranging links with the non-associated countries of Asia and 
Latin America. 
During the 1970's, formal trade and economic cooperation agreements 
were concluded with four South Asian States India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka. An agreement has also been signed with the member coun-
tries of the Association of South East Asian Nations - ASEAN - and with 
the Chinese Peoples Republic. Discussions on the negotiation of an agree-
ment with the Republic of Korea are under way. 
Similar commercial and economic cooperation agreements have been 
negotiated with four Latin American states- Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Argentina- while a global framework agreement with the member states 
of the Andean group was negotiated in 1983. 
Agreements between the EC and the non-associated countries are «non-
preferential» because they do not lead to any reduction in EC tariffs for 
the import of goods from these countries. Nor is the EC committed to 
giving the same amount of aid to the non-associates as it is to members 
of the Lome Convention or the countries in  the South Mediterranean. 
Despite this, however, EC aid and trade with the countries in Asia and 
Latin America have grown substantially over the years. 
All non-associated states are also eligible for European Community food 
aid, emergency assistance, trade promotion facilities as well as preferential 
access to the EC's market as a result of the Community's Generalised 
System  of  Preferences.  The  non-associates  financial  and  technical 
assistance programme is now a well-established component of the Com-
munity's overall development cooperation policy. 
In the two-year period 1981-1983 the Community reinforced its links with 
different non-associated countries and regions of the Third World,  in-
cluding India, Nepal, the ASEAN states and Latin America. The follow-
ing pages summarise briefly just what this expansion has meant for the 
EC and its partners in the developing world. 
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ccThe relationship between India and the European Community is not on-
ly economic. It has an important politic dimension. It is a relationship bet-
ween two unions of democracy». This was the message conveyed to the 
Indian authorities by Gaston Thorn, the President of the European Com-
mission, when he paid an official visit to New Delhi in November 1982. 
The EC's links w!th India, a giant among developing countries (with a 
population of 680 million and a land area roughly twice that of the EC), 
date back to 1962 when India first established a diplomatic mission to 
the EC. The two sides signed a commercial cooperation agreement in 
December 1973 to develop and diversify trade. This pact became a model 
for similar agreements between the EC and other developing countries 
outside the Lome Convention. 
Negotiations for the conclusion of a new economic cooperation-agreement 
between India and the EC ended in April 1981  and the new pact, which 
is wider-ranging and more comprehensive than the previous agreement, 
was signed in June 1982. The new arrangement provides for industrial, 
scientific and technical cooperation between the two sides,·and could, 
once again, pave the way for similar agreements with other South Asian 
countries - Pakistan,  Bangladesh and Sri  Lanka. 
Both sides have agreed to set up a new council designed to bring together 
Indian and EC businessmen. The aim of the programme is to help In-
dian industry make a bigger breakthrough on the Community market, to 
bring together potential business partners, and to identify the scope for 
increased economic cooperation whether in the marketing of Indian pro-
ducts in Europe, the development of the Indian market or, finally, in the 
development of Indian exports on world markets. 
India  is  the  leading  beneficiary  of the  EC's  financial  and  technical 
assistance programme for non-associated developing countries and has 
received over 180 million Ecus from this programme over the past five 
years. India also heads the list of developing countries which are regular 
beneficiaries of the EC's food aid programme. In  India's case, EC aid 
is used to develop local dairy industries through the wide-ranging ccOpera-
tion  Flood»  programme. The  EC  is  committed to  providing a  total  of 
186,000 tonnes of milk powder and 114,000 tonnes of butteroil to the six-
year project at a total cost (at present world prices) of about 200 million 
dollars. 
EC trade with India represents about 1% of the Community's total trade. 
The EC is,  however, India's largest export market, with 26°/o  of all ex-
ports going to the EC, compared with 12% sent to the United States. The 
EC is also the leading exporter to India, supplying 26% of total Indian 
imports. EC exports to India totalled four billion Ecu in 1982 while Com-
munity imports from that country came to 2.6 billion Ecu in the same year. 
The EC Commission opened a delegation in New Delhi in the spring of 
86 1983 which is also responsible for relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldive Islands. 
Relations with Nepal 
The EC sought closer relations with Nepal in 1981  when a Commission 
delegation visited the country to look at development projects for future 
assistance and later in 1982 when Commission President Gaston Thorn 
met Nepalese leaders in Katmandu. Total trade between the Communi-
ty and Nepal is about 30 million Ecu. Nepal's main exports to the Com-
munity, all of which have duty-free access, are raw jute, carpets, leather, 
vegetables and some handicrafts. Nepal has also benefitted from the Com-
munity's programme of aid for non-associated countries to the tune of 
5.2 million Ecu and received some food aid, following the drought which 
hit the country in  1979. 
The European Community and ASEAN 
The European Community's political, economic and trade links with the 
five member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN : Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) 
have been growing steadily over the last ten years, ever since both sides 
decided to set up a regular dialogue (through the ASEAN Brussels Com-
mittee) and later, in 1975 when a «Joint Study Group» to examine ques-
tions of mutual economic interest was created. 
The EC welcomed the formation of ASEAN in 1967 recognising the viability 
of the organisation  and  its  potential  in  regard  both  to  the  economic 
development of the region and to political stability in the whole of South-
East Asia.  Increasing contacts between the EC and ASEAN led to the 
conclusion in March 1980 of a wide-ranging cooperation agreement which 
is in fact the first such agreement to be concluded in the name of ASEAN 
by its five members. The pact is evolutionary in  character, flexible and 
covers such areas as trade and economic cooperation. It also provides 
for cooperation between the two sides for the development of the ASEAN 
region as a whole. 
Trade promotion is an important part of the new agreement and the EC 
has set up a number of schemes designed to promote exports from the 
ASEAN region. These schemes include the organisation of exporter's 
trade missions to Europe and European buyers' missions to ASEAN, par-
ticipation in fairs for ASEAN members, organisation of workshops, the 
provision of experts in various fields, the setting up of trade centres, etc. 
Although trade between the EC and ASEAN has grown over the years 
(EC exports to the region for instance have gone up from 1.6 billion Ecu 
in 1973 to 8.4 billion Ecu in 1982), EC experts stress that the Community 
-and EC businessmen- have been slow to appreciate the opportunities 
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for  more  intense  economic  exchanges  with  ASEAN.  ASEAN  today 
represents only 2.4% of the Community's external trade and is therefore 
much less important an outlet for EC exports than either members of the 
Lome Convention or the Latin American states. Much the same trend can 
be seen in the investment field. Japanese investments in ASEAN have 
grown rapidly and are estimated at just over one third of total foreign in-
vestment in the region, as against about 16% for the United States and 
only 14% for the Community. 
An ASEAN-EC Business Council has also been set up to encourage the 
development of trade and investment in the two groups of countries. 
ASEAN governments and the EC have made it clear that their private 
sector has a key role to play in strengthening economic and trade ties 
between the two sides. 
Development cooperation  is  another major area covered  by the  EC-
ASEAN agreement, and commits the EC to cooperating with ASEAN in 
order to contribute to the region's self-reliance, economic resiliance and 
social well-being. This is done through EC financing for development pro-
jects and  programmes including  food  production  and  supplies,  rural 
development, education and training facilities. The EC has to date spent 
a total of 84 million Ecu for development projects in Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines and for regional projects for ASEAN as a whole. 
There  is  another  important  element to  the  EC-ASEAN  relationship : 
ministerial meetings, attended by foreign ministers from both sides which 
have become a regular feature of the EC-ASEAN dialogue. Three such 
meetings, devoted to a study of international political issues, have been 
held between the two sides. 
In addition to the regular ministerial consultations, the EC-ASEAN agree-
ment also provides for annual meetings of the Joint Committee set up 
to monitor how the pact was being implemented. 
New moves in relations with Central America 
In addition to its existing links with Latin American countries (including 
a regular dialogue with ambassadors from the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA), and the new agreement with the Andean Pact states), 
the Community has focussed attention on helping the poorer nations of 
the Central American region. 
Although the possibility of a global framework arrangement with the Cen-
tral  American  states  was  raised  as  early  as  1975,  subsequent 
developments in the region (especially as tar as human rights are con-
cerned) narrowed the scope and content of the EC's dialogue with the 
Central American states. This dialogue has, in fact, been limited to a series 
of meetings between Ambassadors of the Central American isthmus and 
the European Commission. 
88 The EC has, however, continued to include the Central American states 
in its annual programme of financial and technical assistance to the non-
associated states. The six countries have, in fact, received over 50% of 
EC aid to Latin America in  recent years. 
The political and economic importance of boosting EC ties with Central 
America was stressed by European Heads of State and Government at 
their meeting in  Brussels in  March  1982. The European Commission 
followed up on the European Council proposals in June 1982 by sending 
a communication to the Council of Ministers which called for special finan-
cial measures to promote economic and social development in Central 
America. The main emphasis in the Commission's call for a new approach 
was on stepping up aid to Central America, and helping the region in 
its attempts to reform its agriculture and agrarian policies. 
The EC Commission's call tor increased aid to the Central American states 
was accepted by the Council of Ministers in November 1982 when a deci-
sion to give an  additional 30 million Ecu in  financial and technical aid 
was finally taken. The money is destined primarily for rural development 
projects as part of the agrarian reform currently under way in  most of 
Central America. The additional aid will virtually double the amount of 
funds  originally  provided  for  Central  American  by  the  EC  and 
demonstrates the Community's desire to contribute towards the socio-
economic stabilisation of the region. 
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